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I.
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This appeal is from a memorandum decision dated June 17,2011, and the subsequent
order dated July 26, 2011. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann § 78A-3-102 (2011).
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IL
ISSUES PRESENTED & STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Where two insurance policies potentially apply to a loss, may an insured elect which

of its insurers is to cover the loss by tendering its defense to only one insurer, and not the
other, and thereby foreclose the insurer to whom the claim was tendered from obtaining
contribution from the other insurer? This issue was preserved at R. 114-18.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted
to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2,
If 6, 177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, f 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001).
2.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Where an insured has more than one policy potentially covering a loss, may a insurer

tender a claim to another insurer pursuant to an "other insurance" clause, where such a tender
is against the express wishes of the insured? This issue was preserved at R. 117-18.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted
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to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2,
U 6,177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, K 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001).
3.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, no discovery - other than

an initial set of interrogatories and requests for production - was warranted? This issue was
preserved at R. 109-10.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A denial of a request for additional discovery under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Price Dev. Co. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, ^f 30,995
P.2d 1237 (2000); Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994).
4.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Did the trial court err in concluding that, as a matter of law, UBIC was prohibited

from conducting discovery and introducing parol evidence regarding the intent of Pioneer
Roofing Company and UBIC with respect to the commencement date for the 2008 policy?
This issue was preserved at R. 110-14.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c) (2011). Because summary judgment involves questions of law, no deference is granted
to the district court's ruling and it is reviewed for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT 2,
f 6, 177 P.3d 600 (2008); Mitchell v. Christensen. 2001 UT 80, \ 8, 31 P.3d 572 (2001).
Page 3 of49
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III.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2011) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal requires that this Court consider whether the targeted tender rule, which

has been adopted in several other jurisdictions, should be adopted in Utah. In this case, it is
undisputed that the insured, Pioneer Roofing Company ("Pioneer"), tendered the claim of its
injured employee to Workers Compensation Fund ("WCF"), but never tendered the claim to
its other insurer, Utah Business Insurance Company ("UBIC"). Indeed, Pioneer specifically
instructed UBIC in writing not to get involved, and expressing its desire that WCF pay the
claim. At issue is whether WCF, pursuant to an "other insurance" clause, can override the
clear and undisputed wishes of the insured and seek contribution from UBIC - effectively
resulting in a forced tender of the claim by Pioneer to UBIC.
B.

Course of Proceedings
1.

On August 5,2010, WCF filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief in the Third

District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. R. 1 -16. The basis for the Complaint was
a request for a determination whether identical "other insurance" clauses in WCF's and
UBIC's policies obligated UBIC to share in the medical and indemnity costs advanced by
WCF to Russell Antone. Id
2.

On October 13, 2010, UBIC filed its Answer. R. 22-27.

3.

On March 11, 2011, WCF filed its motion for partial summary judgment,
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seeking the entry ofjudgment based upon the twin "other insurance" clauses. R. 53-55.
4.

On March 28, 2011, UBIC filed its opposition to WCF's motion for partial

summary judgment. R. 100-156. On the same day, UBIC also filed a countermotion for
summary judgment in which UBIC advanced the argument that the targeted tender rule
should be applied. R. 97-99.
5.

On April 18, 2011, WCF filed its reply to the opposition to the motion for

partial summary judgment. R. 167-347. On the same day, WCF also filed its opposition to
UBIC's countermotion for summary judgment. Id.
6.

On April 22,2011, UBIC filed its reply to the opposition to the countermotion

for summary judgment. R. 348-346.
7.

On June 15, 2011, oral argument was held before Judge Maughan regarding

the motions for summary judgment. R. 370.
8.

On June 17, 2011, Judge Maughan issued a memorandum decision granting

WCF's motion for partial summary judgment and denying UBIC's countermotion for
summary judgment. R. 371-375.
9.

On July 26,2011, Judge Maughan entered an Order consistent with the analysis

and conclusions set forth in the memorandum decision, and he certified the judgment as final.
R. 378-385.
10.

On August 16, 2011, UBIC filed its Notice of Appeal. R. 386-396.

11.

Effective September 15,2011, the Supreme Court entered an order transferring
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the case from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, subject to a request for retention
by either party. R. 410-411.
12.

On October 13, 2011, after considering the submission of both parties with

respect to retention, the Supreme Court ordered that it would retain the case. R. 412-413.
C.

Statement of Facts
On March 21, 2008, Russell Antone was employed by Pioneer at a roofing project

located in Salt Lake City, Utah. R. 3, 58,102. While Mr. Antone was working on the roof
he fell through a skylight opening, landing on the floor approximately twelve feet below. Id,
Mr. Antone suffered severe spinal injuries and is a paraplegic. LI
Following the accident, Pioneer notified its workers compensation insurance carrier,
WCF, of the accident involving Mr. Antone.

R. 58. WCF accepted the claim as

compensable and assumed its obligations under the policy by paying all medical expenses
and indemnity benefits to Mr. Antone. R. 58.
At the time of the industrial accident, Pioneer was purportedly covered by two
workers compensation insurance policies - one policy with WCF and another with UBIC.
R. 53-54. Pioneer had recently attempted to switch workers compensation insurance carriers,
and the UBIC policy mistakenly initiated coverage for Pioneer prior to the expiration of the
WCF policy. R. 104-108. As a result, the WCF policy had a coverage period of April 1,
2007 through April 1,2008, and the UBIC policy had a coverage period of February 22,2008
through February 22,2009. R. 57. There was, therefore, 39 days of overlapped coverage -
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assuming that Pioneer intended to have dual coverage at all. 14 Both policies had identical
"other insurance" clauses, which provided as follows:
We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs
covered by this insurance and other insurance or self-insurance.
Subject to any limits of liability that apply, all shares will be
paid equal until the loss is paid. If any insurance or selfinsurance is exhausted, the shares of all remaining insurance
will be equal until the loss is paid.
R. 57-58, 107.
On March 10, 2010, nearly two years after the date of the industrial accident, WCF
notified UBIC of the overlapping coverage and demanded payment from UBIC pursuant to
the "other insurance" clause. R. 271-72. Until notified by WCF, UBIC had no knowledge
of the overlapping policies or of the accident suffered by Mr. Antone. R. 108. Pioneer never
tendered the claim to UBIC, nor is there any language in either WCF's or UBIC's policy that
required Pioneer to tender the claim to both insurers. R. 9-16,117-18,126,204-231. Upon
learning that there was potentially overlapping workers compensation insurance coverage,
Pioneer made it clear to UBIC that it did not want UBIC to pay the claim. R. 346. Pioneer
also expressed its desire that WCF pay the claim, h i In October of 2010, John Stout, the
owner of Pioneer, wrote a letter to UBIC stating that it was always Pioneer's intention that
WCF pay the claim and that UBIC should not get involved. 14 To date, UBIC has not paid
any costs or expenses associated with Mr. Antone's claim. R. 59. Pioneer paid all premiums
due to WCF. R. 126.
<
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V.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court's order, which requires UBIC to prorate on a 50/50 basis the medical
and indemnity costs paid to Mr. Antone, is in error. The targeted tender doctrine, which
should be adopted in Utah, upholds the wishes of an insured to choose whether to tender a
claim and, if multiple policies could potentially cover a loss, whether to tender to claim to
some, or all, of its insurers. The right of an insured to select which of its insurers should
respond to a claim is a protected and paramount right. The presence of an "other insurance"
clause does not trump this right - it only directs the court how to apportion the damages
among carriers legally obligated to pay a claim. Where there is no tender by an insured, there
is no legal obligation by the insurer to pay.
The undisputed facts in this case show that Pioneer Roofing never tendered the claim
to UBIC and affirmatively declared its intention that WCF pay the claim. By this election,
the UBIC policy is unavailable to pay the loss. The "other insurance" clause is irrelevant
because the WCF policy is the only policy available to pay the claim - there is no "other"
insurance.
In the alternative, and assuming that the targeted tender rule is not adopted by this
Court, the case should nevertheless be remanded for further discovery. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(f) provides a safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary
judgment. It is applied liberally to ensure that the parties are granted the time to conduct the
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necessary factual exploration that, if denied, forces a party to prematurely prove its case.
UBIC's request to conduct additional discovery was neither dilatory nor lacking in merit, but
was justified, and the trial court erred in denying the Rule 56(f) motion.
Finally, extrinsic evidence, including parol evidence, may be introduced to show
mutual mistake, even where a writing is unambiguous. The evidence may be introduced to
show that the writing does not conform to the intent of the parties. It is reversible error for
a trial court to grant a motion for summary judgment where there is a factual issue as to what
the parties intended.

Page 10 of 49
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

VI.
ARGUMENT
A.

The district court erred when it ordered that WCF could seek equitable
contribution from UBIC where Pioneer, the insured, never tendered the claim
to UBIC.
Equitable contribution has long been recognized as a remedy that permits one insurer

to recover from another insurer who is also responsible for the loss. However, an insurer is
not liable to defend or indemnify a claim until the insured provides notice of the claim to the
insurer. While some states require a formal "tender" of the claim from the insured to the
insurer, others merely require notice from the insured. However, the common thread running
through these decisions is that the insured must advise the insurer of the loss to trigger the
insurer's obligation under the policy. No other person - not even another insurer - may
tender a claim on behalf of an insured.
As will be demonstrated below, Pioneer never tendered the claim involving Mr.
Antone to UBIC.

Instead, when WCF demanded contribution from UBIC, Pioneer

specifically advised UBIC that it had tendered the claim to WCF and that UBIC was not to
get involved. R. 346. Pioneer also specifically expressed its intention that WCF pay the
claim, not UBIC. WL Therefore, UBIC has no obligation to pay the claim. The right of an
insured to determine whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered is a paramount right
that must be protected. To conclude otherwise requires a finding that WCF - a stranger to
the contract between Pioneer and UBIC - has greater rights to detemiine whether a claim
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should be tendered than does Pioneer. Contrary to the rulings of multiple other jurisdictions
that have considered the issue, the district court below erred in trampling the rights of
Pioneer to tender this claim. The judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the
targeted tender rule should be adopted in Utah.
L

Equitable contribution may only be sought from other insurers to whom
the claim has been tendered.

Equitable contribution refers to the right of one party to recover from another party
for a common liability. Firemanfs Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279,
1293, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296 (1998). In the context of insurance law, equitable contribution
"permits an insurer, which has paid a claim, to seek contribution directly from other insurers
who are liable for the same loss

" Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Nat'l Fire

Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (D. Mont. 1995): see also Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co.
v. USF Ins. Co.. 191 P.3d 866, 872 (Wash. 2008).
In deciding whether one insurer is liable to another insurer for equitable contribution,
"the inquiry is whether the nonparticipating coinsurer 'had a legal obligation'" to provide
defense or indemnity coverage. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Court. 140 Cal. App. 4th
874, 879,44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841 (2006) (quoting American Continental Ins. Co. v. American
Casualty Co., 86 Cal. App. 4th 929, 938, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (2001)). "Equity provides
no right for an insurer to seek contribution from another insurer who has no obligation to the
insured." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 872 (Wash. 2008) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.
v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 1315 (Idaho 1992)); see also Forum Ins. Co. v.
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Ranger Ins. Co.. 711 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. 111. 1989); Marwell Constr.. Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's. London. 465 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1970); Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 366 P.2d
455 (Cal. 1961); Nat'l Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos.. 724 P.2d 544 (Ariz. 1986); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127, 137 (Utah 1997) (holding that
contribution by one insurer from another is only permitted where the other insurer(s) had an
equal legal obligation to defend the insured yet failed to do so). Similarly, equitable
contribution is equally unavailable as between coinsurers that do not share the "same level
of liability on the same risk as to the same insured." Safeco Ins. Co.. 140 Cal. App. 4th at
879, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 841 (2006).

"An insurer who, pursuant to its policy obligations,

undertakes the defense of its insured, has no right to contribution... from a second insurer,
absent a request from the common insured that it join in the defense." Federated Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co.. 480 F. Supp. 599,600 (D. Term. 1979).1 Where the

1

While several of the cases cited involve the duty to defend, this case involves only
the duty to indemnify. The two duties are distinct in that the duty to defend arises when a
complaint contains any allegations that could make an insurer liable to an insured under the
policy, while the duty to indemnify arises when an insured is actually liable to a claimant and
that claimant's injury is covered by the language of the policy. Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw
Ins. Co.. 1 P.3d 1167, 1172 (Wash. 2000). It is also well settled that the duty to defend is
broader than the duty to indemnify. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d
127, 133 (Utah 1997). Because the duty to defend is broader than an insurer's duty to
indemnify, where there is not a duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify. See Lee R.
Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, 14 Couch on Insurance § 200:3 (3d ed., West 2010); Great
American Ins. Co. v. Calli Homes. Inc.. 236 F. Supp. 2d 693, 698 (S.D. Tex. 2002). The
principle that an insurer cannot anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim, and that
it is the insured that must tender the claim to the insurer to invoke coverage, applies equally
well to the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend.
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insured neither discloses the claim nor requests that the insurer assist, there is no tender.
This legal principle was best set forth by the Washington Supreme Court, which stated:
[A]n insurer cannot be expected to anticipate when or if an
insured will make a claim for coverage; the insured must
affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired.
Thus, breach of the duty to defend cannot occur before tender.
The duties to defend and indemnify do not become legal
obligations until a claim for defense or indemnity is tendered.
Further, the insurer who seeks contribution does not sit in the
place of the insured and cannot tender a claim to the other
insurer. Thus, if the insured has not tendered a claim to an
insurer prior to settlement or the end of trial, other insurers
cannot recover in equitable contribution against that insurer.
Mutual of Enumclaw, 191 P.3d at 873 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also
Cellex Biosciences, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 537 N.W.2d 621,623 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) ("Tender is a condition precedent to creation of a duty to indemnify.5'); Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Company v. Gulf Insurance Company, 776 F.2d 1380,1383 (7th Cir.
1985). "The duty to defend is a continuing one, arising on tender of defense and lasting until
the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for
coverage . . . . " Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins Co., 18 Cal. 4th 857, 869,
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (1998); Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35,46,65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366
(1997). Phrased somewhat differently, "[t]he duty to defend arises when the insured tenders
defense of the third party lawsuit to the insurer." Foster-Gardner, 18 Cal 4th at 886, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 107; 14 Couch on Insurance § 200.40 (noting that the insured generally is required
to tender a claim to all insurers which the insured wants to respond to the claim); see also
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i

CargilL Inc. v. ACE American Ins. Co.. 784 N.W.2d 341,354 (Minn. 2010) (holding that "a
primary insurer that has a duty to defend, and whose policy is triggered for defense purposes,
has an equitable right to seek contribution for defense costs from any other insurer who also
has a duty to defend the insured, and whose policy has been triggered for defense
purposes.")Only the insured, or an authorized agent acting at the specific request of the insured,
can properly tender a claim and trigger coverage. Institute of London Underwriters v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Company. 599 N.E.2d 1311,1313 (111. Ct. App. 1992); Bituminous
Casualty Corp. v. Roval Insurance Co. of America. 704 N.E.2d 74, 79 (111. 1998); Hartford
Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 1383. The express instruction of an insured controls
as to whether or to what extent an insurer has a duty to defend. Schilli Leasing, Inc. v.
Forum Insurance Company, 628 N.E.2d 185 (111. Ct. App. 1993). Simply put, where an
insured has not tendered a claim to an insurer, that insurer is excused from its duties under
the policy. Casualty Indem. Exchange Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. at 1239; Solo Cup v. Federal
Insurance Co., 619 F.2d 1178,1183 (7th Cir. 1980).
The reasoning underlying this rule is logical: "an insurer cannot be expected to
anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim for coverage; the insured must
affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired." Grifin v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
29 P.3d 777,781 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven. 983 P.2d 1155
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997)). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated in this regard:
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[M]ere knowledge that an insured is sued does not constitute
tender of a claim. What is required is knowledge that the suit is
potentially within the policy's coverage coupled with knowledge
that the insurer's assistance is desired. An insurance company
is not required to intermeddle officiously where its services have
not been requested.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity. 776 F.2d at 1383 (citations omitted); see also Casualty
Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239; Purvis v. Hartford Ace, and Indem. Co.. 877
P.2d 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
Although an occurrence during the policy period may give rise to a potential claim,
an insurer cannot fairly or logically be expected to discharge its duties under the policy
before or until such time as it has been notified of the claim by the insured. Several state
supreme courts and intermediate appellate courts have opined that, while little is required to
invoke an insurer's duties under an insurance policy, at a minimum, notice of the claim must
be given by the insured to the insurer. See Cincinnati Cos. v. West Am. Ins. Co.. 701 N.E.2d
499,504 (111. 1998) (holding that "the better rule is one which allows actual notice of a claim
to trigger the insurer's duty to defend, irrespective of the level of the insured's sophistication,
except where the insured has knowingly forgone the insurer's assistance."); White Mountain
i

Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 631 A.2d 907,910 (N.H. 1993) (holding that "in order
for an insured to tender the defense to the insurer, it need only put the insurer on notice of
the claim."); Towne Realty. Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co.. 548 N.W.2d 64,67 (Wis. 1996) (holding
that "[a] tender of defense occurs once an insured has been put on notice of a claim against
the insured."); Home Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. of Pittsburgh. 658 N.W.2d 522
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(Minn. 2003); Cobb v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 488 So.2d 349, 350 (La. Ct. App.
1986); Widener Univ. v. F.S. James & Co.. 537 A.2d 829, 833 (Pa. Super. 1988); see also
Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d at 13 83; Casualty Indem. Exchange Ins. Co.. 902
F. Supp. at 1239; Litton Systems. Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv.. Ltd.. 579 P.2d 48, 52 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978); American Mut. Liab. Ins. v. Michigan Mut. Liab.. 235 N.W.2d 769 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1975) (each holding that the insured must not only give notice to the insurer, but
must specifically request that the insured defend the suit). Thus, an insurer has no duties
under the policy, nor can it breach any duty under the policy, prior to the insured tendering
the claim. Grifin. 29 P.3d at 782; see also McCartv v. Parks. 564 P.2d 1122, 1123 (Utah
1977) (noting that an insurer must receive notice of a claim and be provided an opportunity
to defend prior to being bound by any judgment).
In this instance, the district court erred in concluding that WCF could seek equitable
contribution from UBIC. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that neither Pioneer
nor anyone acting on Pioneer's behalf ever tendered the claim to UBIC. R. 117-18,126. In
fact, UBIC was not even aware that Mr. Antone had sustained an accident until two years
after it had occurred, and this notice came from WCF, not Pioneer. Id Pioneer subsequently
unequivocally stated its desire that WCF pay the claim and that UBIC should not pay it. R.
346. Without a tender of the claim by Pioneer to UBIC, UBIC was under no legal obligation
to pay the claim. UBIC should not be compelled to pay a claim that was never tendered to
it and which Pioneer has specifically requested that it not cover. The order of the district
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court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC.
2.

The targeted tender rule2 protects an insured's paramount right to choose
whether to tender a claim to an insurer.

Factual situations occasionally arise where an insured has multiple insurance policies
potentially covering the same claim. In these circumstances, the insured typically elects to
tender the claim to all available insurers, leaving the insurers to argue over the language of
the various policies to determine how the loss should be allocated. These finger-pointing
disputes often result in litigation, with the claim sometimes left unpaid for years until there
is a resolution. The issue of tender in these cases is never raised because the insured has
tendered to all available carriers.
However, on rare occasions, an insured will elect to tender a claim to fewer than all
available insurers.3 When presented with these narrow facts, courts have fashioned a rule -

2

The targeted tender rule is sometimes referred to as the "selective tender rule" or the
"doctrine of selective non-tender." For purposes of this appeal, the doctrine will be referred
to as the targeted tender rule.
3

The targeted tender rule applies only among concurrent primary insurers (which
UBIC and WCF are in this case). The situation is much different, however, where the
insurers provide different types of coverage, such as between a primary insurance policy and
an excess insurance policy. When the insurers do not stand in the same position relative to
each other, an insured cannot use the targeted tender rule to choose to impose a coverage
duty on an insurer with an "other insurance" excess provision in its policy to the exclusion
of other co-insurers with whom the insured holds a primaiy policy. Under these
circumstances, an insured must first exhaust all its primary coverage. See, e ^ , Kajima
Construction Services. Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 879 N.E.2d 305 (111.
2007). Accordingly, in Kajima, the insured, despite its targeted tender to the excess carrier,
was required to first exhaust the limits of its primary policy prior to legally invoking
coverage under the excess policy. Id.
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the targeted tender mle - to protect the insured's right to choose to whom it wishes to tender
a claim. While the application of this doctrine is an issue of first impression in Utah, the
targeted tender mle should, nevertheless, be adopted.
To illustrate the application of the targeted tender mle, the underlying facts and
reasoning by the Illinois Supreme Court in John Bums Constr. Co. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 727
N.E.2d 211 (111. 2000) are instructive. In Bums, the insured, John Bums Constmction
Company, tendered the defense of a personal injury claim to Indiana Insurance Company.
Id at 213. Bums made it clear that it did not want Royal Insurance, another carrier insuring
Bums that could potentially cover the loss, to become involved in the claim. Id When
Indiana refused Bums' tender, Bums and Royal jointly filed a declaratory judgment action
against Indiana, seeking a declaration that Indiana had the sole duty to defend and indemnify
Bums pursuant to the targeted tender. Ld Indiana counterclaimed in the suit, claiming that
the costs should be shared equally with Royal pursuant to the "other insurance" clause
present in both policies. Id at 214. Indiana argued that "its policy contemplates that more
than one insurer might face exposure and that the policy provides a formula for sharing the
costs of defending and indemnifying the claim." Id at 215. The Illinois Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's judgment that Bums' tender to Indiana triggered the "other
insurance" clause in Indiana's policy which, in turn, triggered Royal's duty to defend.4 Id

4

Notably, this "domino-theory" of tendering a claim is the same conclusion that the
district court judge reached in this case, noting that "Pioneer's tender of this claim to WCF
rather than to UBIC is irrelevant." R. 371-374. Just as the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
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at 214. In other words, both lower courts concluded that an "other insurance" clause trumps
an insured's right to choose whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered.
Burns appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The issue on appeal, which is the
precise issue before this Court, was "whether an insurer to whom litigation is tendered and
whose policy contains an 'other insurance' clause . . . may seek contribution from another
insurer whose policy is in existence but whose coverage the insured has refused to invoke."
Id at 214. In reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the court concluded that an
insured has the right to choose to whom a claim should be tendered, notwithstanding the
presence of an "other insurance" clause. The court stated:
It is only when an insurer's policy is triggered that the insurer
becomes liable for the defense and indemnity costs of a claim
and it becomes necessary to allocate the loss among co-insurers.
The loss will be allocated according to the terms of the "other
insurance" clauses, if any, in the policies that have been
triggered.

An "other insurance" clause in a policy will not automatically
reach into coverages provided under other policies merely
because such other policies are in existence. The insured still
must be given the right to determine whether it wishes to invoke
its rights to such other coverages before those coverages
become accessible under the uother insurance "provision oj a
triggered policy.
Burns, 727 N.E.2d at 216 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

this flawed reasoning in Burns, this Court should similarly reject the flawed conclusion of
the district court.
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The Bums court continued:
The insurance provided to Burns by Royal was not "available,"
in the language oj the "other insurance " provision, for Bums
had expressly declined to invoke that coverage. Moreover, we
do not believe that the presence of the "other insurance"
provision in the Indiana policy serves by itself to trigger the
coverage afforded by Royal's policy. An "other insurance"
provision does not in itself overcome the right of an insured to
tender defense of an action to one insurer alone.

Bums made clear that it did not want Royal to become involved
in the matter and that the defense was being tendered solely to
Indiana. Therefore, Indiana was foreclosed from seeking
equitable contribution from Royal.
Bums, 727 N.E.2d at 217 (emphasis added).
An "other insurance" clause does not trigger obligations in any other policy available
to pay a loss, nor does it empower insurers to tender a claim to another insurer. Rather, the
purpose of an "other insurance" clause is to apportion a loss, based upon the terms of the
"other insurance" clause - whether pro-rata, escape, or excess - among those policies
obligated to cover the loss.5 See 15 Couch on Insurance § 219:1; 219:9.
Because notice is required to trigger coverage under a policy, the failure to tender a

5

To put it another way, an "other insurance" clause only acts at the insurer level. It
does not affect the right of an insured to recover, or an insured's right to forego making a
claim, under a particular policy. See 15 Couch on Insurance § 219:1; Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1154 fn. 11 (D.N.J. 1993);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Northbrook Excess and Surplus Ins. Co., 494 N.E.2d 634, 650 (111. Ct.
App. 1986); Bazinet v. Concord General Mut. Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 279, 281 (Me. 1986).
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claim means the policy is never called upon to defend or indemnify, and coverage is not
provided. See Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239. See also Golden Eagle
Ins. Corp. v.Cen-Fed. Ltd.. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279,148 Cal. App. 4th 976,984 (2007); Garcia
v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London. 156 P.3d 712, 721 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007); Coastal
Refining & Marketing. Inc. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.. 218 S.W.3d 279.294
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Volmar Construction Co.. Inc.. 300 A.D.2d 40,
42, 752 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2002); American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.. 235 N.W.2d at 774;
Gribaldo. Jacobs. Jones and Associates v. Agrippina Verisicherunges A.G.. 476 P.2d 406
(Cal. 1970); Eastman v. United States. 257 F. Supp. 315, 319 (S.D. Ind. 1966).
Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. involved contribution claims between two insurers that
had issued liability policies to a motel where a guest was injured. After the guest filed suit,
the insured tendered the claim to Casualty Indemnity but not to the other insurer, Liberty
National. After Casually Indemnity paid the claim it filed a contribution action against
Liberty National. The court granted summary judgment dismissing Casually Indemnity's
contribution claim, holding: "where the insured has failed to tender the defense of an action
to its insurer, the latter is excused from its duty to perform under its policy.. .." Casualty
Indem. Exch. Ins. Co., 902 F. Supp. 1235 at (D. Mont. 1995).
The holding in Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co. is in line with Cincinnati Cos. v. West
Am. Ins. Co.. 701 N.E.2d 499, 503 (111. 1998). In Cincinnati Cos.. the insurer had actual
notice of the suit because one defendant had tendered to the insurer, but their insured co-
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defendant had not. After discovering the potential coverage, the co-insurer brought suit for
equitable contribution. In its decision denying the request for contribution, the court stated:
The duty to defend falls solely on the selected insurer. That
insurer may not in turn seek equitable contribution from the
other insurers who were not designated by the insured. This rule
is intended to protect the insured's right to knowingly forego an
insurer's involvement.
Cincinnati Cos., 701 N.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted). As further noted by the Illinois
Supreme Court:
When several insurance policies are available to the insured, that
insured has the paramount right to choose or knowingly forego
an insurer's participation in a claim. The insured may choose to
forego an insurer's assistance for various reasons, including the
insured's fear that premiums would increase or that the policy
would be cancelled in the future. Moreover, an insured's ability
to forego that assistance should be protected. . . . When an
insured has knowingly chosen to forego an insurer's assistance
by instructing the insurer not to involve itself in the litigation,
the insurer is relieved oj its obligation to the insured with
regard to that claim. The targeted insurer, then, has the sole
responsibility to defend and indemnify the insured. That insurer
may not seek equitable contribution from the other insurers that
were not designated by the insured.
Legion Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 822 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (111. 2004) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Employers Ins. v. James McHugh Constr. Co., 144 F.3d
1097, 1107 (7th Cir. 1998).
Similarly, in Institute of London Underwriters. 599 N.E.2d 1311 (111. 1992), the court
concluded that an insured has the right to choose which policy will apply. In that case, the
Institute of London Underwriters provided coverage to an injured party's employer as a
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named insured and to the employer's general contractor as an additional insured. A suit was
filed against the general contractor by the estate of a fatally injured employee, and Institute
of London accepted tender of this claim from the general contractor. The contractor advised
its insurer, Hartford, of the pending claim but instructed Hartford not to contribute to the
defense or indemnification of the action. Institute of London later sued Hartford, seeking
equitable contribution. Both the circuit court and the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
the claim for equitable contribution was defeated by the contractor's instructions to Hartford
not to defend or indemnify the action. The court held: "if the policy is never triggered, the
issue of liability under the 'other insurance' clause does not arise.'" Institute of London
Underwriters, 599 N.E.2d at 1315; see also Bituminous Casualty Corp.. 704 N.E.2d at 796;
XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Patrol Helicopters. Inc.. 2009 WL 4929261 (D. Mont. December 21,
2009), affd. 411 Fed. Appx. 78,2011 WL 182154 (9th Cir. January 20,2011) (holding that
in the context of equitable contribution, where a claim has not been tendered an insurer is
excused from its duty to pay. The targeted tender rule bars the claim).

6

The underlying facts of Bituminous Casualty are noteworthy. In Bituminous
Casualty, the primary insurer was brought into the case after its insured advised it of a
personal injury lawsuit filed against the insured. The insured also advised its secondary
insurer that it was looking solely to the primary insurer for defense against the lawsuit and
for compensation in the event of an adverse verdict. Although the insured could also have
sought protection and compensation from the secondary insurer, it declined to do so. The
primary insurer eventually settled the case, and thereafter sought partial contribution from
the secondary insurer pursuant to the "other insurance" clauses present in both policies. The
primary insurer's subrogation claim was dismissed on summary judgment based upon the
application of the targeted tender rule.
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In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Unigard Ins. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d
516, (2000), an insurer was asked to contribute to defense and indemnification costs after the
litigation had ended. The insurer refused to contribute on the grounds that it had not been
asked to participate in the litigation - by tender of defense or otherwise. The court found that
it was inequitable to deny control of the defense and then charge the protesting insurer with
expenses about which it knew nothing. As stated by the court:
[Unigard Ins. Co's] insured tendered the defense of the... cases
to [Truck Ins. Exchange], not Unigard. Absent tender, it is
difficult to understand what, if anything, Unigard was supposed
to do. Although the defense was tendered to, and accepted by,
Truck, Unigard did not receive notice of its potential liability for
contribution until after t h e . . . cases were resolved. Under these
circumstances, the imposition of contribution on Unigard - a
stranger to the litigation - would subject it to a significant
financial burden even though it did not enjoy any of the
concomitant benefits, e.g., the right to participate in and control
the defense
Truck should not be permitted to drag Unigard
into the picture after the fact.
Truck Ins. Exchange v. Unigard Ins. Co.. 79 Cal. App. 4th 966,979,94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516,525
(2000) (citations omitted).
The situation in this appeal is not unlike the authority cited. The targeted insurer,
WCF, who is displeased with the election of the insured, Pioneer, seeks to effectuate a forced
tender of the claim to the non-targeted insurer, UBIC. In other words, WCF seeks to trigger
coverage of the UBIC policy, and forcibly override Pioneer's wishes, by usurping the
privilege of the insured to decide whether, and to whom, a claim should be tendered.
However, coverage cannot be triggered by a rival insurer. See, e ^ , Hartford Accident and
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Indemnity. 776 F.2d at 1383; Bituminous Casualty Corp.. 704 N.E.2d at 79.
In Hartford Accident and Indemnity, the City of Peoria was insured by Hartford and
named as an additional insured on Gulfs policy. Hartford Accident and Indemnity, 776 F.2d
at 1383. The City tendered the claim to Hartford. Id. Ten months later, Hartford's attorney
asked Gulf to assume the City's defense. LI Gulf refused. Id The Seventh Circuit held
that the City's defense was not adequately tendered to Gulf because there was no evidence
that the City ever asked Gulf to defend it. Id.
Finally, in Mutual of Enumclaw, the Washington Supreme Court also adopted the
targeted tender rule. In Mutual of Enumclaw, USF Insurance Company ("USF"), Mutual of
Enumclaw Insurance Company, and Commercial Underwriters Insurance Company
("CUIC") all insured Dally Homes, Inc., a homebuilder and developer, for a condominium
development called Windsong Arbor. After completing the development, the Windsong
Arbor Homeowners' Association sued Dally Homes for construction defects. Dally Homes
subsequently tendered the claim to Mutual of Enumclaw and CUIC, but not to USF. Mutual
of Enumclaw and CUIC later brought an action for contribution and subrogation against
USF, claiming it should share in the costs as a co-insurer. The trial court adopted the
targeted tender rule, but the Washington Court of Appeals reversed. USF appealed to the
Washington Supreme Court.
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the insured,
Dally Homes, had the right to selectively tender the claim. The court based its decision on

Page 26 of 49
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the fact that USF had no legal obligation to pay the claim because Dally Homes never
tendered the claim to it. The court concluded: "In sum, because Dally [Homes] chose not to
tender to USF, USF had no legal obligation to defend or indemnify Dally [Homes] at the time
of the settlement. Accordingly, we hold that [Mutual of Enumclaw] and CUIC do not have
a right to equitable contribution from USF." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 874.7
In this instance, Pioneer has clearly and unequivocally foregone the assistance of its
insurer, UBIC, and no other insurer should be permitted to force UBIC to pay the claim. On
the undisputed facts of this case, Pioneer elected not to enforce its contractual insurance
policy rights by choosing not to provide notice of the claim to its insurer, UBIC. R. 346. In
October of 2010, Pioneer unequivocally reaffirmed its intention to selectively tender the
claim to WCF and that UBIC should not get involved. R. 346. The salient part of Pioneer's
instruction to UBIC is seen as follows:

The claim involving the injury to Russ Antone was filed in

7

Note that the court also underscored the role of the insured in tendering the claim by
distinguishing claims of equitable contribution from subrogation claims. In the context of
equitable contribution, an insured retains the right to selectively tender the claim. However,
where an insurer is able to stand in the shoes of the insured, the insurer is then able to tender
the claim, notwithstanding the targeted tender rule. Thus, "an insurer who receives full
contractual assignment of an insured's rights may bring a conventional subrogation claim to
enforce those rights." Mutual of Enumclaw. 191 P.3d at 875. In this case, which is of the
equitable subrogation variety, there are no facts to support a tender by WCF to UBIC on
behalf of Pioneer.
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March 2008 while we were insured with WCF and in the
process of writing insurance with UBIC. It was always our
intention to have this claim paid through WCF. We had paid
into the WCF for many years. We do not want to get UBIC
involved in this claim.
R.346.
Tendering a claim is a necessary and crucial prerequisite to an insurer's duty to
provide coverage. Accordingly, in the absence of a tender, as in this case, there is no duty
on the part of the insurer to cover the claim. The simple fact is that WCF is attempting to
compel UBIC to cover a claim that was never tendered to it by Pioneer - effectively creating
a "forced tender" against Pioneer's wishes. The authority cited herein demonstrates that
WCF's attempt to tender a claim to another insurer is invalid.
The targeted tender rule has sound policy underpinnings that justify its adoption in
Utah. Foremost of these justifications is that the rule preserves an insured's right to choose
whether to invoke, or not to invoke, the terms of its insurance contracts. An insured may
choose not to tender a claim to its insurer for a variety of reasons. An insured may choose
not to tender a claim in order to avoid a premium increase; it may want to preserve its policy
limits for other claims; it may want to safeguard its relationship with its current insurer; or
it may simply elect not to tender the claim because of a bad experience on a prior claim.
Whatever its reasons, an insured has the right not to tender to its insurer. Allowing forced
contribution defeats that right. It allows another insurer, who is not a party to the insurance
contract, to decide on behalf of the insured whether a claim must be tendered. It forces an
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insured to be force-fed the consequences it sought to avoid by not tendering the claim. An
insured must have the right when more than one insurer's policy potentially covers a loss to
seek or not to seek an insurer's participation in a claim as the insured chooses. This right to
elect does not change merely because the claim is made under workers compensation
insurance. "[A]n insured's ability to forgo that assistance should be protected." Cincinnati
Cos.. 701 N.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted); Garcia. 156 P.3d 712 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007)
(insured may decline a defense, and the insurer's duty is relieved).
The targeted tender rule is also not a right that is prohibited in the policies at issue.
There is no provision in either WCF's policy or UBIC's policy that requires Pioneer to tender
the claim to all available insurers. R. 9-16,204-231. The best, and only, argument WCF has
is that the "other insurance" clause somehow requires a tender. However, the case law cited
herein clearly provides that an "other insurance" clause is only applicable where multiple
policies are available to pay the loss. A policy is only available to pay a loss where the
insured has tendered a claim under that policy. The result is that a tender to one carrier is not
a tender to all carriers, and where no tender is made by the insured, an "other insurance"
clause is ineffective in forcing the carrier to whom no tender was made to share in the loss.
Here, there was one tender by Pioneer - the tender to WCF. It is undisputed that Pioneer
never tendered the claim to UBIC. R. 126. Absent clearly contrary and controlling language
in a policy that requires an insured to tender a claim to all insurers that may potentially
provide coverage, if an insured, such as Pioneer, is covered by two insurance policies, but
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tenders the claim to only one of the insurers, that right to choose should be upheld. To hold
otherwise requires a finding that an insurer has a greater right than an insured to determine
whether a claim should be tendered to another insurer - a conclusion that finds no legal
support.
j*

Admittedly, the targeted tender rule has only been adopted by a few jurisdictions. The

factual circumstances giving rise to the doctrine - a tender by an insured under a contract to
fewer than all available insurers - rarely arise. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been
unanimously approved by those jurisdictions that have considered it. It is, therefore,
improper to label the targeted tender doctrine a minority position.
Finally, the fact that workers compensation coverage is required in Utah, or that the
Labor Commission's website reflects dual coverage in this case, are red herrings that are
irrelevant to the targeted tender issue. UBIC admits that workers compensation coverage is
required in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-201 (2008). UBIC also admits that, solely
for purposes of the targeted tender issue, dual coverage was in place on March 21, 2008 the date Mr. Antone was injured. However, the fact that dual coverage was in place does not
obligate Pioneer to tender to both insurers, nor does the requirement for coverage allow WCF
to tender the claim to UBIC. There is no authority for such propositions. Like the factual
scenario presented in every case cited herein where the targeted tender rule was adopted, dual
coverage for a loss was the prerequisite to allowing an insured to choose to tender the claim
to none, some, or all of its insurers. This case is no different in this regard. Dual coverage
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was in place on the date of injury, and Pioneer retained its paramount right to elect to whom
to tender the claim, notwithstanding the requirement for coverage.

Pioneer, as the

policyholder, paid the premiums on both policies, and is uniquely positioned to determine
whether to make a claim under one of its policies. No contractual provision in either policy
granted WCF the right to tender a claim on behalf of the insured. Simply put, the fact that
this is a workers compensation case is irrelevant.
Based upon the undisputed fact that Pioneer tendered the claim to WCF and not to
UBIC, only the WCF policy was triggered by Pioneer and, therefore, only the WCF policy
should bear the cost of the Antone claim. Under such circumstances, the order of the district
court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC.
3.

WCF is not a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between
UBIC and Pioneer.

The targeted tender rule is a doctrine firmly rooted in common law contract principles.
Insurance contracts are private contracts between the parties. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co.
v. Wiscomb. 643 P.2d 441, 445 (Wash. 1982). Like other contracts, the rights and
obligations of an insurance contract may only be enforced by the parties to the agreement or
an intended beneficiary. See Wagner v. Clifton. 62 P.3d 440,441-42 (Utah 2002); Benjamin
v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. 2006 UT 37.140P.3d 1210,1213 (Utah 2006) ("An insurance policy
is merely a contract between the insured and the insurer."); Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 421 (1991). "The
benefits conferred by contracts are presumed to flow exclusively to the parties who sign the
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contracts." Bvbee v. Abdulla. 2008 UT 35, 189 P.3d 40, 49 (2008) (citing Tracv Collins
Bank & Trust v. Dickamore. 652 P.2d 1314,1315-16 (Utah 1982)): see also Allstate Ins. Co.
v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329, 334 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 302 (1981); Alcan United Inc. v. West Bent Mut. Ins. Co., 707 N.E.2d 687,695
(111. 1999). Only under circumstances where the contract "clearly intended to confer a
separate and distinct benefit upon the third party" can it be enforced by a third-party
beneficiary. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993). It follows
that, in the absence of a intended third-party beneficiary, the insurer and the insured, as
parties to the contract, are the only parties free to choose whether or not to enforce the
contract. To allow a co-insurer - a stranger to the contract - to enforce the terms of the
insurance policy would effectively create third-party beneficiary rights where none were
intended by the contracting parties. In this regard, the United States District Court for the
District of Montana has stated:
The right of an insurer to contribution from a coinsurer exists
when both insurers are liable for the loss; a situation which can
only arise when the obligation of both insurers under their
respective policies are 'triggered'. Otherwise, if the doctrine of
equitable contribution were applied to a coinsurer for a claim
never tendered by the insured to that coinsurer, the insurance
policy becomes, in effect, a third-party beneficiary contract
entered into by the insuredfor the direct benefit oj other carriers.
Such a rule would be 'inequitable' in that it would require an
insurer to reimburse another carrier for a claim it has no
obligation to pay to its insured and in circumvention of the
insurer's wishes with whom it has the contract.
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Casualty Indem. Exch. Ins. Co.. 902 F. Supp. at 1239 fh. 4 (D. Mont. 1995) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added); Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co.. 218 F.3d 204,210-211
(2d Cir. 2000); Signal Cos.. Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co.. 27 Cal. 3d 359,369,612 P.2d 889 (1980)
("The reciprocal rights and duties of several insurers who have covered the same event do
not arise out of contract, for their agreements are not with each other.") (quoting Am. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Sur. Co.. 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 195-96,318 P.2d 84 (1957)).
In this case, Pioneer entered into an insurance contact with UBIC, and WCF was not
a party or an intended beneficiary of that contract. R. 203-231. WCF, therefore, cannot force
UBIC to pay a claim that Pioneer specifically instructed UBIC not to pay. Moreover, WCF
cannot argue that the "other insurance" clause is a gateway for it to tender a claim under the
UBIC policy. Only an insured can tender a claim to its insurer, and no tender was made by
Pioneer to UBIC. UBIC, therefore, has no obligation to pay the claim. Pioneer exercised its
paramount right not to invoke coverage under its contract of insurance with UBIC, and WCF
cannot exercise those rights on Pioneer's behalf. Equity cannot circumvent the wishes of the
insured to create contractual obligations in a policy that was never triggered by the insured.
The order of the district court should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of UBIC.
B.

Granting WCF's motion for partial summary judgment was premature, and the
case should be remanded for further discovery.
Assuming, arguendo, the targeted tender rule is not adopted by this Court, the case

should nevertheless be remanded for further discovery. In its order, the district court
concluded that further factual discovery would be "unnecessary" and "irrelevant under the
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parol evidence rule." R. 381. This erroneous conclusion was reached by ignoring the liberal
standards by which Rule 56(f) motions are judged; by ignoring applicable Utah case law; and
by concluding that sufficient time had been provided for discovery, when the reality was that
UBIC was forced to prematurely prove its case. As will be demonstrated below, the district
court abused its discretion in denying UBIC's request for additional discovery.
URCP 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as
is just.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) (2011)
Under Utah law, "summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete
since information sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient
to defeat the motion." Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275, 278 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987). "An important objective of rule 56(f) is to ensure that a diligent party has been
provided adequate opportunity for discovery." Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540 (Utah 2000)
(citing Price Dev. Co.. L.P. v. Orem City. 2000 UT 26, H 30,995 P.2d 1237 (2000)); see also
10B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil § 2740 (3d ed. 1998) ("The purpose of [Rule 56(f)] is to provide an
additional safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment... and
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[the rule] should be applied with a spirit of liberality."). "A rule 56(f) motion has merit when
it targets core issues that might defeat the pending summary judgment motion." Energy
Management Services. L.L.C. v. Shaw. 110 P.3d 158,161 (Utah Ct.App. 2005); see also Salt
Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop.. Inc.. 2002 UT 39,f 24,48 P.3d 910 (2002) (stating
that a motion for a continuance does not lack merit when it "requests] an opportunity to
continue with factual exploration on an issue that could [defeat a] summary judgment
motion").
A reviewing court analyzes a trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion by applying
the "limits of reasonability" standard set forth in Crossland Sav.. 877 P.2d at 1243-44. It is
not a bright-line test for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion; rather, it
is a test that is based upon the specific circumstances of each case. In Overstock.com. Inc.
v. SmartBargains. Inc.. 2008 UT 55,192 P.3d 858 (2008), a non-exhaustive list of relevant
considerations was provided by the Utah Supreme Court to determine whether a Rule 56(f)
motion should be granted. These are:
(1) an examination of the party's rule 56(f) affidavit to determine
whether the discovery sought will uncover disputed material
facts that will prevent the grant of summary judgment or if the
party requesting discovery is simply on a "fishing expedition,"
(2) whether the party opposing the summary judgment motion
has had adequate time to conduct discovery and has been
conscientious in pursuing such discovery, and (3) the diligence
of the party moving for summary judgment in responding to the
discovery requests provided by the party opposing summary
judgment.

Page 35 of 49
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Id, 2008 UT 55,121,192 P.3d at 865; see also Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co.. 745 P.2d
838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d 311, 312-314 (Utah 1984). In
applying these and all other relevant factors dictated by the facts of the case, courts generally
construe Rule 56(f) liberally in favor of the requesting party to allow for adequate discovery,
unless the request is "dilatory or lacking in merit." Energy Management Services. 110 P.3d
at 160 (citing Western Dairymen. 2002 UT 39,f 24,48 P.3d 910); Reeves v. Geigy Pharm..
Inc.. 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 106
S. Ct. 2548, 2554-55 (1986) (premature summary judgment motions can be dealt with by
applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow for additional time to conduct necessary discovery).
While dilatory behavior will vary from one case to the next, the conclusions of several
courts regarding what constitutes dilatory behavior are instructive. See, e ^ , Jensen v. Smith.
163 P.2d 657,658 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that two and a half years from inception
of the lawsuit to the filing of the motion for summary judgment was sufficient time to
conduct discovery); Overstock.com. 2008 UT 55,192 P.3d at 866 (concluding that two years
in which to conduct discovery was sufficient for Overstock to conduct discovery); Crossland
Sav.. 877 P.2d at 1243-44 (Rule 56(f) motion denied because no discovery was initiated by
the party seeking a continuance). As summarized by one court: "a party's rule 56(f) motion
for a continuance is not dilatory if the party has already initiated discovery proceedings,
diligently seeks access to information that is within the sole control of the adverse party, and
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is denied an adequate opportunity to conduct the desired discovery." Western Dairymen.
2002UT39,48P.3dat917.
Like Salt Lake County in Western Dairymen. UBIC had initiated discovery procedures
and intended to pursue additional factual exploration. In both cases, the Rule 56(f) affidavit
stated that additional discovery time was needed for a particular issue. The Western
Dairymen court concluded that, while a bright-line could not be applied, two months was
insufficient to conduct discovery. The court reasoned that the County did not have enough
time to "read the responses to its interrogatories, analyze the documents it received, and then
determine who should be deposed and what questions should be asked. Additionally, it had
to schedule a date to take the depositions... [which] required accommodating the schedules
of not only the deponents but at least two attorneys as well." Id. at 918. There was simply
to little time - only two months - to perform the tasks vital to the County's case
development.
Similarly, there was insufficient time to conduct discovery in this case. Initial
disclosures were exchanged on December 3, 2010, and WCF filed its motion for partial
summary judgment on March 11,2011. R. 40-46,53-55. During these three, short, holidayfilled months, the parties only exchanged one set of discovery requests, and UBIC was still
awaiting responses to its discovery requests from WCF when the motion for summary
judgment was filed. R. 50,160-61. Like Salt Lake County, UBIC was still evaluating the
information it had gathered to determine who should be deposed and what questions should
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be asked. However, before UBIC could take any depositions, and before UBIC even had the
chance to discover the evidence necessary to support its defenses, WCF filed its motion for
summary judgment. By denying the Rule 56(f) motion, the court improperly forced UBIC
to prematurely prove its case. This was the precise issue that Rule 56(f) was designed to
avoid. UBIC was not dilatory in pursuing discovery.
In addition, UBIC's Rule 56(f) affidavit was meritorious. UBIC's affidavit made
clear that it sought to conduct additional written discovery and to take depositions with
regard to several issues, including the intent of the parties and the negotiations that drove the
procurement of the 2008 policy. R. 154-56. The discovery UBIC sought to conduct was
central to proving UBIC's defenses of mutual mistake and reformation of the 2008 policy.
UBIC's affidavit identified discoverable issues that would have precluded the granting of
WCF's motion. The argument that these factual issues would be proven by parol evidence
is irrelevant. See, e.g.. West One Trust Company v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993); Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666,669 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Robert
Langston Ltd. v. McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)); Grahn v. Gregory.
800 P.2d 320, 327 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Mabev v. Kav Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d
287, 290 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 565 P.2d 63,64 (Utah 1977) (citing Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah415,429,222 P.2d 571,
578-79 (1950)) (each holding that parol evidence is admissible to show mutual mistake).
Extrinsic evidence of mutual mistake may be used to reform a contract, including an
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insurance policy. See, e.g.. Hess v. Ford Motor Co.. 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220,27 Cal. 4th 516,
525 (2002) ("It is the rule that, where the writing itself, through mistake, does not express
the intention of the parties who entered into i t . . . and the writing does not therefore contain
the real contract between the parties, the objection as to parol evidence is without merit.");
Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits' Ins. Ass'n.. 615 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 2000); Rvan v.
Mountain States Helicopter. Inc.. 686 P.2d 95, 99 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Simon v. Truck
Insurance Exchange. 757 P.2d 1123 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Shaw v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co..
262 S.E.2d903 (S.C. 1980): Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wall. 249 S.E.2d
588 (Ga. 1978); Niagara Fire Insurance Co. v. Allied Electrical Co.. 319 So.2d 594 (Fla. Ct.
App.1975); Coal Operators Cas. Co. v. F.S. Neelv Co.. 243 S.W.2d 744 (Ark. 1951);
Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. Heiner. 245 P.2d 415 (Ariz. 1952); Prudential Fire Ins. Co. v.
Stanley. 131 P.2d 88 (Okla. 1942). The discovery UBIC sought to conduct, but was
precluded from conducting by the premature granting of summary judgment, went to the very
heart of UBIC' s defense of mutual mistake and reformation.
UBICs conduct was not dilatory and its Rule 56(f) affidavit was meritorious. UBIC
was only requesting the chance to conduct additional discovery to prove its defenses.
UBICs Rule 56(f) Affidavit made clear that no depositions had been taken, and that
additional written discovery was contemplated regarding "The intent of the parties and the
scope of the negotiations at the time the 2008 policy was procured from UBIC." R. 155. It
was an abuse of discretion to grant WCF's motion for summary judgment in the face of
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UBIC's 56(f) motion. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded to allow the parties to conduct additional discovery.
C.

The trial court erred in concluding that as a matter of law, UBIC was prohibited
from introducing parol evidence regarding the intent of Pioneer and UBIC with
respect to the 2008 policy.
In granting WCF's motion for summary judgment so early in the discovery process,

UBIC's efforts to discover the information necessary to prove its defenses were stifled. At
the same time, the court also concluded that, as a matter of law, UBIC could not introduce
parol evidence of the parties' intent to support its defense of mutual mistake. This
conclusion was reached by the trial court in spite of the uncontroverted affidavit of John
Stout, owner of Pioneer, wherein Mr. Stout affirmed that he "never intended to have
overlapping workers' compensation insurance coverage." R. 126. At the very least, Mr.
Stout's affidavit created a material issue of fact that could not be resolved on summary
judgment. As will be demonstrated below, the district court's conclusion was erroneous.
1.

Parol evidence is admissible to show mutual mistake.

A "mistake" in the context of an insurance contract is a belief which is not consistent
with the facts surrounding the risk and/or issuance of the policy. See 2 Couch on Insurance
§ 27:2. A mistake is mutual where the parties have agreed to accomplish something by a
contract, and the contract ineffectively or incompletely accomplishes that objective. Mabey,
682 P.2d at 290. Numerous Utah courts have admitted parol evidence to show that the
writing did not conform to the intent of the parties. See, e.g., Manila Corp., 565 P.2d at 64
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(citing Sine, 118 Utah at 429,222 P.2d at 578-79); Grahn, 800 P.2d at 327 n. 8.
Most applicable to the case before this Court is the case of West One Trust Company
v. Morrison. 861 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In that case, three properties were
conveyed by warranty deeds to Merlin Morrison Sr. ("Sr.") and Merlin Morrison Jr. ("Jr.")
as joint tenants. Upon Sr.'s death, the personal representative of Sr.'s estate, West One,
argued that the properties were held in a partnership, which dissolved upon Sr.'s death.
Accordingly, West One argued, full ownership did not vest entirely in Jr. upon Sr.'s death;
rather, each owned a one-half interest in the properties.
At trial, West One argued that the deeds did not demonstrate the parties' true intent,
and that the joint tenancy designation was a mistake. Jr., on the other hand, argued that the
deeds were unambiguous on their face, and that the trial court could not look beyond the four
corners of the documents. The trial court adopted the argument advanced by Jr. and West
One appealed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The court began with the general rule that
"when a writing is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence will ordinarily not be allowed to vary
the terms of the writing." Id at 1061 (citing Sparrow v. Tayco Constr. Co., 846 P.2d 1323,
1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court then articulated the exceptions to the rule:
Exceptions to the parol evidence rule exist, however, when there
is an issue as to whether the parties intended the writing as an
integrated contract, and when what appears to be a complete and
binding integrated agreement . . . may be voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake or the like, or it may be illegal. Such
invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear on the
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face of the writing. Therefore, parol evidence may be
admissible to show mutual mistake, occurring when both parties,
at the time of contracting, share a misconception about a basic
assumption or vital fact upon which they based their bargain.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
After noting that a joint tenancy agreement is subject to reformation on the basis of
mutual mistake, the court concluded that "parol evidence is admissible to demonstrate that
a mutual mistake resulted in a document which does not accurately reflect the intent of the
parties." Id The court then stated that it was reversible error by the trial court to preclude
the introduction of extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Id "A motion for summary
judgment may not be granted if... there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended."
Id at 1062 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,108 (Utah 1991)).
Significantly, the court also made clear that the question of whether the agreement
should actually be reformed is a subsequent inquiry to the issue of introducing extrinsic
evidence. After concluding that parol evidence is admissible, the court noted that if mutual
mistake is established by clear and convincing evidence, only then may the document be
reformed. Id
Here, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that parol evidence could not be
introduced based upon the clear and unambiguous nature of the 2008 policy. R. 378-385.
However, this was the precise argument that was raised, and rejected, in the West One case.
Like the trial court in the West One case, the trial court in this case prohibited the
introduction of extrinsic evidence that could have demonstrated the intent of Pioneer and
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UBIC with respect to the 2008 policy. Such a conclusion was erroneous. At a minimum,
UBIC should have been granted the opportunity to introduce evidence of the parties' intent.
Only then could the trial court determine the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to
reformation. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case remanded.
2.

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-205 does not make UBIC liable as a matter
of law,

WCF argued to the trial judge, and the trial court ordered, that UBIC should be liable
as a matter of law under § 34A-2-205, and that to allow an insurance company to present any
defense with regard to coverage would corrupt the workers compensation system. R. 378385,414. In other words, regardless of how blatant the mistake or the underlying facts to the
contrary, if the Labor Commission's database indicates that coverage was in place, Section
34A-2-205 prohibits the introduction of any evidence to contradict or to explain this mistake.
This radical argument cannot be accepted.
In 2008, Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-205( 1) provided:
(a) An insurance carrier writing workers' compensation
insurance coverage in this state or for this state, regardless of the
state in which the policy is written, shall file notification of that
coverage with the division or its designee within 30 days after
the inception date of the policy in the form prescribed by the
division.
(b) A policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effect from
inception until canceled by filing with the division or its
designee a notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by
the division within ten days after the cancellation of a policy.
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under
Subsection (l)(b) will result in the continued liability of the
carrier until the date that notice of cancellation is received by the
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division or its designee.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-205 (2008).
UBIC does not dispute the intent of this section or the numerous circumstances where
this statute may be applied in favor of finding coverage. However, there is nothing within
§ 34A-2-205 that prohibits the introduction of defenses to coverage. At best, the strongest
conclusion that can be drawn is that the statute provides a rebutable presumption of coverage
that may be refuted by the carrier through the introduction of evidence to the contrary.
This conclusion is consistent with the analysis applied by the Labor Commission. In
Zavala v. Prestwich Lumber Co. et aL Utah Labor Commission Case No. 99-0339 (April 30,
2001), Mr. Zavala was injured on May 7, 1998. The parties in Zavala did not dispute that
Mr. Zavala was entitled to workers compensation benefits; the only question was whether
Liberty Mutual had coverage on the date of injury, or whether the Uninsured Employers'
Fund must step in and pay workers compensation benefits on the employer's behalf. The
parties jointly paid benefits to Mr. Zavala pending the resolution of the dispute. The Labor
Commission records showed that Liberty Mutual provided workers compensation coverage
effective May 2,1998, but Liberty Mutual claimed that coverage began May 11,1998. The
issue, as stated by the Labor Commission, was as follows: "Pursuant to § 34A-2-205 of the
[Workers Compensation Act], is Liberty Mutual liable for Mr. Zavala's workers'
compensation benefits solely on the grounds that Liberty Mutual notified the commission it
was Mr. Zavala's insurance carrier?"
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The Administrative Law Judge concluded that "regardless of the parties' actual intent
or any other considerations, Liberty Mutual's notice to the Labor Commission of the May 2,
1998 coverage date results in Liberty Mutual's absolute liability for Mr. Zavala's workers'
compensation benefits." Id. at p.2.
On appeal, the Labor Commission refused to affirm the finding of the ALJ, and
remanded the case pending the outcome of the related district court case.8 The Labor
Commission noted that it could not say Liberty Mutual was absolutely liable as a matter of
law under § 34A-2-205. IcL The Labor Commission also acknowledged that there may be
situations where, in spite of Section 205, coverage will not necessarily automatically be
inferred. Id. "Any such determination requires additional findings of fact." Id.
Additional fact-finding is the only relief sought by UBIC with respect to this issue.
At the outset of the case, without any depositions and very little written discovery, UBIC was
confronted with WCF's motion for summary judgment. UBIC raised its defenses and argued
that Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) should preclude the granting of WCF's motion. However, UBIC
was unreasonably denied the opportunity to conduct discovery to prove its defenses. There

8

Because the Labor Commission is a court of only limited jurisdiction, it does not
have the authority to decide coverage disputes where issues of contract interpretation may
arise. The ALJ decided the issue on the basis of UEF's argument that § 34A-2-205 allows
the Labor Commission to decide the issue without reference to the district court proceedings.
Upon deciding that additional factualfindingswere required, the Labor Commission deferred
to the district court case to allow such findings to be made. The district court (United
Staffing Alliance v. Jaime Zavala, Case No. 000906043, Third Judicial District), ultimately
ruled in favor of UEF; however, such a ruling properly occurred only after the parties were
allowed to present evidence at trial.
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was a material issue of fact - the commencement of coverage for the UBIC policy - and,
unlike the well-reasoned course that the Zavala case took (both before the Labor Commission
and the district court) in allowing factual discovery, the district court in this case ignored this
material issue of fact to reach its conclusion that WCFs motion for summary judgment
should be granted. However, this material issue of fact cannot be decided as a matter of law,
and certainly cannot be decided by only applying section 34A-2-205. A court cannot decide
the coverage dispute in this case as a matter of law because of the factual issues raised
regarding commencement of the UBIC policy. The granting of WCFs motion was not only
premature, but it was improper. Section 34A-2-205 does not automatically foreclose a
party's right to defend a claim. The order of the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded for further factual discovery.
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VII.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the targeted tender rule has sound legal and policy
underpinnings that justify its adoption in Utah. The targeted tender rule recognizes that an
insured has a paramount right to choose whether, and to whom, to tender a claim. No insured
should be forced into tendering a claim, nor should an insured's wishes be trumped by
another insurer. The undisputed reality of this case is that Pioneer never tendered the claim
to UBIC and, therefore, UBIC was not legally obligated to pay the claim. In the context of
the "other insurance" clause, the UBIC policy was "unavailable". Understanding that the
UBIC policy is not available to pay this claim - pursuant to the explicit and written directives
of Pioneer - it is clear that UBIC cannot be ordered by WCF to pay Mr. Antone's claim
pursuant to the "other insurance" clause. The order of the district court should be reversed
and judgment entered in favor of UBIC.
Alternatively, the case should be remanded to allow for additional factual discovery.
UBIC was forced to prematurely prove its defenses in response to WCF's motion for
summary judgment. Despite the fact that very little discovery had been conducted, and no
depositions taken, the district court refused to grant UBIC's Rule 56(f) motion or to deny the
motion and allow UBIC to introduce parol evidence in support of its defense of mutual
mistake. These denials by the district court were erroneous. UBIC's Rule 56(f) affidavit
justified the additional time for discovery; Utah law also is clear with regard to introducing
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parol evidence: it may be introduced to show mutual mistake. UBIC should be granted the
opportunity to conduct discovery.
Respectfully submitted this

4L
\-J "day of December, 2011.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Micl
Scott R. Taylor
Attorneys for Utah Business Insurance Company
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN f 7 2011
SALT LAKt ooui* i Y
B y _

'

^
Deputy CleriT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 100914170

:

UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 15, 2 011, in
connection with the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to
further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal
authorities and counsel's oral argument.

Being now fully informed, the

Court rules as stated herein.
This is a declaratory judgment case where the plaintiff and the
defendant provided overlapping workers' compensation coverage to Pioneer
Roofing Company ("Pioneer") for the period of February 22, 2008, through
April 1, 2008. On March 21, 2008, Pioneer's employee Russell Antone was
"catastrophically

injured."

Workers Compensation Fund

(nWCF") has

continuously paid the weekly compensation and medical expenses to Mr.
Antone.
WCF's Motion for Summary Judgment seeks to have this Court apply the
twin "Other Insurance" clauses in the two workers' compensation insurance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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policies,

thus

holding
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Business

Insurance

Company (nUBIC")

responsible for one-half of the WCF benefits paid to Mr. Antone.

These

clauses provide that where other insurance exists, the insurer will pay
its pro-rata share of the loss.
WCF also points to Utah Code Ann., § 34A-2-205(b), which provides
that

u

[a] workers' compensation policy is in effect from inception until

canceled . . . . * Further, under Subparagraph

(c) of that statute,

* [f ] ailure to notify the division [of cancellation] . . . results in
continued liability of the carrier."

WCF argues that this statute sets

forth a standard of continuing coverage and evidences a legislative
intent

to protect

injured

workers

by

holding

insurance

carriers

responsible for coverage until formal cancellation.
UBIC's Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment relies on the selective
or targeted tender doctrine.

Under this doctrine, an insured who is

covered by multiple insurance policies may designate which of the
insurers will provide coverage.
claim to UBIC.

In this case, Pioneer did not tender a

UBIC's position is that Pioneer's wishes should be

respected and the targeted tender doctrine applied to make WCF solely
responsible for Mr. Antone's benefits.
After considering the parties' respective legal positions, the Court
declines to apply the targeted tender doctrine in this case.

This

doctrine has never been adopted in Utah and has never been applied in a
workers' compensation insurance coverage case by the handful of other
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jurisdictions which have applied this doctrine. Overall, the Court rules
that this doctrine represents a minority position which runs counter to
§ 34A-2-205 and the legislative intent evidenced by this statute.
Therefore, UBIC's Motion seeking to apply this doctrine is denied.
The Court further rules that the UBIC policy was effective
beginning on February 22, 2008. Further factual discovery on this point
is unnecessary and, indeed, would be irrelevant under the parol evidence
rule.

The UBIC policy is clear and unambiguous that the effective date

of the policy commenced on February 22, 2008, a date which is repeated
some thirty times in the policy.

UBIC will not be allowed to present

extraneous evidence to alter this plain language.

Further, UBIC has

failed to present any legal or factual support for its premise of mutual
mistake and the applicability of contractual reformation, particularly
in this context of workers' compensation coverage.
Next, under § 34A-2-205, the Court rules that the February 22, 2 008,
UBIC policy is active and covers Mr. Antone's March 21, 2008, industrial
injury.

UBIC has not issued a notification of cancellation of the 2008

policy.

Further, its filing of a second policy with the Industrial

Commission does not negate the effective date of the February 22, 2008,
policy, which remained active from its inception and provided continuous
coverage under § 34A-2-205, including on the date of Mr. Antone's injury.
That leads the Court to its final ruling, namely that UBIC is
contractually responsible under the twin "Other Insurance" provisions for
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its pro-rata share of Mr. Antone's claim. Pioneer's tender of this claim
to WCF rather than UBIC is irrelevant.

Accordingly, WCF's Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted and UBIC's counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied in the entirety.
Counsel for WCF is to prepare an Order consistent with this
Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for review and
signature.
Dated this

//

day of June, 2011.

PAUL (K MAUG.
DISTRICT COUR'
By

S T A M P : i^rr
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Counsel for Workers Compensation Fund
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Plaintiff
vs.

UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE
COMPANY
Defendant

ORDER GRANTING PLATNTD7F
WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND'S "MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT REGARDING
'OTHER INSURANCE"'
and DENYING DEFENDANT
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE
COMPANY'S "COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT"
Civil Case No. 100914170
Judge Maughan

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 15,2011. At issue are plaintiff
Workers Compensation Fund's ("WCF") "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding
'Other Insurance'" and defendant Utah Business Insurance Company's ("UBIC") "CounterMotion for Summary Judgment." Having considered the cross motions for summary judgment
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and legal arguments of the parties, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision dated June 17,
2011, which the Court incorporates herein by reference. The Court finds the following facts:
UNCOIVTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Pioneer Roofing Company, Inc. ("Pioneer") maintained a workers compensation insurance

policy with WCF from April 1, 2007 to April 1, 2008.
2.

Pioneer maintained a workers compensation insurance policy with UBIC from February

22,2008 to February 22, 2009.
3.

WCF and UBIC provided overlapping and concurrent workers compensation insurance

coverage for Pioneer from February 22,2008 to April 1,2008.
4.

During the period of UBIC's and WCF's overlapping insurance coverage, Pioneer

employee Russell Antone ("Antone") was catastrophically injured on March 21,2008 while in
the course and scope of his employment with Pioneer.
5.

The National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") authors workers

compensation form contracts adopted by the Utah Insurance Department. Both WCF's standard
policy and UBICs standard policy contain the following "other insurance" clause:
R

Other Insurance

We will not pay more than our share of benefits and costs covered by this
insurance and other insurance or self insurance. Subject to any limits of liability
that may apply, all shares will be equal until the loss is paid. If any insurance is
exhausted, the shares of all remaining insurance will be equal until the loss is
paid.
6.

WCF has adjusted and paid all medical expenses and weekly compensation

benefits to which Mr. Antone is entitled by the Workers Compensation Act1 to date.
!

See Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-101 et seq.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUES
A*

WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
WCF asked the Court in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for the following

rulings of declaratory relief and partial summary judgment:
1.

The twin workers' compensation insurance policies issued by WCF and UBIC

insuring Pioneer were concurrent, overlapping policies and both were in effect on the day
Antone was catastrophically injured;
2.

The matching "Other Insurance" clauses in the overlapping contracts are clear and

unambiguous;
3.

The matching "Other Insurance" clauses obligate the two insurance carriers to

share the administrative costs and the workers5 compensation liability equally;
4.

UBIC should reimburse WCF a 50% share of the administrative costs and the

payment of the workers' compensation liability for Antone's injuries it has already paid; and
5.

Prospectively, UBIC should share equally with WCF the administrative costs and

the payment of the workers'compensation liability.
The amount of UBIC's 50% share of workers compensation liabilities with respect to
Antone's claim is not the subject of this Order. This is the sole remaining issue between the
parties.
B.

UBIC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
UBIC's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment asked the Court for the following rulings

and summary judgment:
1.

Pioneer never tendered the claim involving Antone to UBIC.
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2.

Once notified of the claim, Pioneer directed UBIC not to pay the claim and that

WCF should pay it.
3.

The Targeted Tender Doctrine, under which an insured may elect which of its

insurers is to cover the loss by tendering its defense to only one insurer, and not the other, should
be applied in this case. Because Pioneer never tendered the claim to UBIC, the UBIC policy is
not available to cover the loss. The "other insurance" clause is, therefore, not triggered nor may
WCF seek equitable contribution from UBIC under the "other insurance" clause.
r

4,

Pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, WCF's motion

should be denied to allow further discovery regarding the intent of Pioneer and UBIC with
respect to the effective date of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy.
ORDER
Having considered the parties' respective legal positions on the cross motions for
summary judgment filed in this matter, and after oral argument and review of the motions and
supporting memorandums filed by the parties, the Court orders as follows:
1.

Pioneer Roofing's 2008 UBIC policy was effective beginning on February 22,

2.

The UBIC policy effective date of February 22, 2008 is clear and unambiguous

2008.

and is repeated some thirty times in the policy. UBIC will not be allowed to present extracontractual evidence in an attempt to alter this plain language found in Pioneer's 2008 UBIC
workers compensation policy.
3.

Further factual discovery regarding the February 22, 2008 effective date of the

UBIC policy is unnecessary and would be irrelevant under the parol evidence rule.
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4.

UBIC failed to present any legal or factual support for its premise of mutual

mistake and the applicability of contractual reformation, particularly in the context of workers5
compensation coverage.
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-2052, the February 22,2008 UBIC

policy is active and covers Mr. Antone's March 21,2008 industrial accident. UBIC has not
issued a notification of cancellation of Pioneer's 2008 UBIC policy that commenced on February
22,2008 as required by Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205 to cancel a workers compensation
contract.
6.

UBIC'sfilingof a second policy with the Labor Commission on February 18,2011

with the effective date of April 1,2008 does not negate the effective date of the February 22,
2008 policy, which remained activefromits inception and provided continuous coverage under
Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205, including the date of Mr. Antone's injury on March 21, 2008.
The Workers Compensation Act does not allow a contract reformation after the date of loss.
7.

The identical "Other Insurance" clauses in Pioneer's overlapping 2008 UBIC and

WCF workers compensation policies are clear and unambiguous. UBIC is contractually
responsible under those identical "Other Insurance" clauses to pay its 50% pro-rata share of Mr.
Antone's claim. The pro-rata share includes reimbursement to WCF for 50% of all benefits and

2

In relevant part, Utah Code Annotated §34A-2-205 provides the following:

(b)

A workers compensation policy is in effectfrominception until canceled byfiling
with the [Industrial Accidents]division [of the Utah Labor Commission]. . .a
notification of cancellation in the form prescribed by the division within ten days
after cancellation ofthe policy,

(c)

Failure to notify the division... results in continued liability of the carrier.
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administrative costs already paid on Mr. Antone's claim3 and a pro-rata 50% share of all future
benefits and administrative costs that will accrue on the claim.
8.

The Court declines to apply the "Targeted Tender" doctrine in this case. Pioneer's

tender of this claim to WCF rather than UBIC is irrelevant. This doctrine has never been adopted
in Utah and has never been applied in a workers compensation insurance coverage case by the
handful of other jurisdictions which have applied this doctrine. The Court rules that the
"Targeted Tender" doctrine is a minority position which runs counter to Utah Code Annotated
§34A-2-205 and the legislative intent evidenced by that statute.
Based on the foregoing, WCF's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding "Other
Insurance" is hereby GRANTED and UBIC's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
The Court hereby certifies, in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1), that there is no
just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment with respect to the issues resolved by this
Order, and that the Court does hereby direct that judgment be entered.

Dated this %

day of July 2011.

BY THE COURT

Honorable Piul G. Maughan
District Court Judge

3

This order does not address the reasonableness of the past benefits and administrative
costs already paid by WCF on Mr. Antone's workers compensation claim. Those issues are still
pending before this Court and subject to further discovery by the parties in accordance with the
case management order in this matter.
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Approved as to form:

S& E.Dyer
Scott R. Taylor
Counsel for Defendant Utah Business Insurance Company

Approved as to form regarding Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) finality paragraph:

James R. Black6
Matthew J. Black
Counselfor Plaintiff Workers Compensation Fund
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND,
Case No. 100914170
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH BUSINESS INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING

JUNE 15, 2011

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL G. MAUGHAN

Transcript of Hearing
June 15, 2011
PROCEEDINGS
BAILIFF: All rise. Court is now in
session, the Honorable Judge Paul Maughan
presiding.
THE COURT: Be seated. Good morning.
(Simultaneously, "Good morning")
THE COURT: We have Mr. Dyer and Mr.
Taylor here, and I assume you are Mr. Black?
MR. BLACK: Yes, James Black, Cynthia
Daniels and Matthew Black representing the Workers
Compensation Fund.
THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Okay,
this is an interesting issue. We're here on
Workers Compensation Fund v. Utah Business
Insurance Company, UBIC, case ending in 4170, and
Workers Compensation Fund has brought a motion for
partial summary judgment in order to get UBIC
involved in this incident and as I read the file,
UBIC doesn't want to do that, but as I read that
correctly, and there's also a Rule 56(f) issue
here.
So, I've read this material and, so,
I'm aware what some of~the issue involved but,
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rather than tell you what I'm thinking right now, I
would just rather hear from each side and then I
will tell you what I'm thinking.
MR. BLACK: Okay.
THE COURT: Yeah, so, Mr. Black, if you
want to proceed.
MR. BLACK: I do, and if it please the
Court, we had prepared some time lines, more to
assist me in what I'm going to present to you than
perhaps to even help you, but will you put those up
there? If it please the Court?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BLACK: This is a smaller version
than the one on the easel.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BLACK: That one first. It helps
me to keep myself in order to do that.
THE COURT: Well, that's fine. Before
you go much further, is this overlapping period, is
that-do we have a dispute on that on whether there
was coverage or not?
MR. DYER: Your HonorTHE COURT: Do you need the Court to
determine that, or have you agreed on that?
MR. DYER: I'm like the Court. I've
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just seen this.
THE COURT: Well, I know you've just
seen this, but there has been an issue in here of
whether your police was enforced or not at the time
of the injury, UBICs policy.
MR. DYER: Yes.
THE COURT: But, do you still—
MR. DYER: There has not been a
stipulation that there is. For purposes of our
counter-motion for summary judgment, we wiil agree
that there were two policies owned by Pioneer
Roofing for purposes of our motion, but based upon
mutual mistake, John Stout has indicated he didn't
want to have dual coverage. He didn't want to be
paying for two policies and thought that the policy
with UBIC would run afterwards.
THE COURT: Okay, so that's still
(inaudible) okay.
MR. DYER: Yes.
THE COURT: Alright.
MR. BLACK: Okay.
THE COURT: Sorry for that, but I was
trying to see if I could narrow something, but I
just opened a hornet's nest, I think.
MR. BLACK: I appreciate that.
Page
THE COURT: So, alright.
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I think a basic
understanding of the Workers Compensation Act
requirement for insurance helps us to see how to
define the issues that are here in this case.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. BLACK: And the concept of the
Workers Compensation Act is that these insurance
policies for employers are required by statute and
they are part of a quid pro quo in the Workers
Compensation Act wherein the employer gives up
common law defenses and the employee gives up
common law causes of action that may be against the
employer in exchange for the no fault benefits that:
are provided by the Workers Compensation Act and as
part of that process, the National Conference of
Compensation Insurance, which is the rate making
contractor for the-retained by the Insurance
Department for establishing rates in the State of
Utah, has provided for insurance carriers writing
Workers Compensation Insurance, a form policy that
each of the insurance carriers has to use and does
use, and it did use in this case, and in the
foreign policy, there is what is called another
insurance clause, and in that other insurance
Page
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clause, in exactly the same place in the policy, it
states, for an insurance carrier, and this is a
contractual term, we will not pay more than our
share of damages and costs covered by this
insurance and other insurance or self-insurance.
All shares will be equal until the loss is paid.
So, the contemplation is that there
will, in fact, be times when there may be more than
one policy covering a given loss and, so, there's a
shared responsibility.
THE COURT: And why is that the case?
I'm not saying it doesn't, but why would that be

13

the case?

14
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MR. BLACK: That would be the case just
as happened here. At the end of a policy, an
employer obtains another policy and the start date
of that policy overlaps the end date of the other
policy and this is taking into account in the
Workers Compensation Act and in the Insurance Code
by statutorily defining when a policy terminates
and it says in 34(a)THE COURT: Before you go thereMR. BLACK: Sure.
THE COURT: Are there--you can stay
there. It's a short question.
Page 7
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MR. BLACK: Okay.
THE COURT: Are there other situations
other than changing insurance carriers o r - t o where
there might be an overlap?
MR. BLACK: There can be. We've run
across otherTHE COURT: Is that the most common?
MR. BLACK: -other situations where
there has been a claim of overlapping insurance
policies when they are~in owner-controlled
insurance programs. That's where an owner hires a
broker and they have insurance coverage for a
project and, yet, one of the subcontractors may
have insurance that covers him or his work
independent of that project.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BLACK: There have been claims that
there is overlap in that circumstance.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BLACK: And there are others that I
could probably conjure up.
THE COURT: That's good enough. Thank
you.
MR. BLACK: But, here, the concept of
the Workers Compensation Act is that you have
Page 8
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mandatory insurance and there should never be a lap
and they protect against any sort of temptation for
mischief of having a Workers Comp contract. It may
cover some employees and not other employees. They
cover the entire place of business and they cover
them until this happens.
A Workers Compensation policy is in
effect from inception, whenever you started, until
cancelled by filing with the Industrial Accidents
Division a notification of cancellation in the form
prescribed by the Division within ten days after
cancellation of the policy. Failure-and this is
important-failure to notify the Division results
in continued liability of the carrier.
THE COURT: Okay. Help me with that
one, and some of these questions may not relate
directly to the issue, but I'm trying to
understand.
MR. BLACK: Sure.
THE COURT: So, if I contract with ABC
Insurance and then I don't pay the insurance
premium when it's d u e MR. BLACK: Uh-huh (affirmative).
THE COURT: - a n d ABC says well, then,
we re not going to cover you, does this relate to
Page
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MR. BLACK: If the Workers Compensation
Fund is given notice that an insured doesn't want
to have insurance with them anymore, and they
have~and they have paid their premiums, the
Workers Compensation Fund needs to go through this
notice process.
Likewise, once a company such as UBIC
has started an insurance policy with--even if
overlapping, with an insured, then it remains in
effect, by statute. The coverage continues. You
can't change the statute. It's there.
THE COURT: Gotya.
MR. BLACK: And that's what happened
here, and this becomes accentuated when you note
that during this overlapping period, Russell Anton
had a catastrophic injury, March 21st, 2008. The
overlapping period was February 22nd, 2008 to April
1st, 2008 and that insurance policy-both insurance
policies are form policies. They are clear on
their face. They do not need interpretation. In
every policy, the start date, the commencement date
is indicated on the policy, not just once, in the
case of the UBIC policy and all the riders, but we
counted them and I think there was something like
30 times it said commencement date for the policy
Page 11
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both the insured and insurance company, that
statute?
MR. BLACK: Yes. If I'm understanding
your question correctlyTHE COURT: Well, for instanceMR. BU\CK: -there is a failure to pay
timely a premium by an employerTHE COURT: Right.
MR. BLACK: - t h e employer's coverage
with that insurance company continues until the
insurance company gives notice of cancellation and
files that notice with the Labor Commission.
THE COURT: So, and the flip side is if
an insured has insurance and wants to change
insurance, that's where you could get double
coverage?
MR. BLACK: Sure.
THE COURT: You could say I started
here, but I didn't tell them to stop and, s o - I
mean, the insurance company may not-I don't mean
to make this too difficult. I'm just trying to
understand. So, but, there can be responsibility
on both sides to counsel, I suppose.
MR. BLACK: Yes, absolutely.
T H E COURT: Thafs-okay.
P a g e 10
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was, in fact, February 22nd, 2008.
UBIC sent a bill to the employer for
the partial month of February 22nd through the end
of February, which was paid saying commencement
date that day.
The Workers Compensation Fund did not,
upon learning of this overlap, tried to not pay the
responsibility. They have paid this loss, this
claim. Just to give Your Honor an idea of how
serious it is has been reserved for something in
the neighborhood of five million dollars.
Mr. Anton is in a situation where his injuries have
caused him to need 24 hour a day attendant care.
THE COURT: So, this is a footnote to
this thing, but when I read the amount, it said 1.5
million had been paid so far. I'm assuming this is
a very unusual circumstance. I thought-Is it true
that Workers Compensation Fund is a sole remedy in
certain cases? That you say, you are covered by
Workman's Comp, so your damage is set at this
amount and you can'tMR. BLACK: I believe, Your Honor, you
are discussing the exclusive remedy provision of
the Workers Compensation Act and~
THE COURT: Right, a n d P a g e 12
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1
2
3
employer or co-employees or the insurance carrier
4
for the employer is the body of benefits provided
5
by the Workers Compensation Act and these insurance
policies, both of them, are identical in reflecting
1 6
7
that they will pay those benefits that are required
8
by the Workers Compensation Act. Does that answer
9
the question?
10
THE COURT: Yeah, this is the exclusive
11
remedy, right?
12
MR. BLACK: As far as I know. I
13
haven't looked into third party aspects and an
14
individual who is injured in the course of his
15
employment still has the right to pursue a civil
16
action for damages against one who is not in the
17
position of employer or co-employee-18
THE COURT: Okay.
19
MR. BLACK: -against a third party, in
20
other words.
21
THE COURT: Okay. I'll quite
22
interrupting for a while. Go ahead.
23
MR. BLACK: It's okay, and this is the
24
situation that is contemplated, and I'm not going
25
to try to make counsel's argument, but this is the
MR. BU\CK: And that provides that the
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THE COURT: Yes.

sole remedy for an injured worker against his

and our Court, for example, in the Sharon Steel
case, and I'm not positive that was cited in our
It's

a 1997 decision and the principles that apply when
there are two insurance carriers on a liability
were discussed in that case.
It said in the third party insurance
context, this Court has held where the insured
settles, for example, with the tort feasor and the
tort feasor and/or its insurance was on notice of
the other's insurance subrogation right, then the
settlement and release will not affect the
insurer's right of subrogation. It's talking about
equitable subrogation when one insurance carrier
has paid the liability of someone, of an individual
that is insured by more than one insurance carrier,
and it says the overwhelming majority of states
allow a subsequent equitable subrogation action by
an insurer.
We have that. We have co-insurance and
this is the majority law, and unless Your Honor has
questions, I would ask to respond. I know that
counsel is going to talk about another theory.
Page

1

to it.

1
THE COURT: You may. You may have that

1

Who

1

is going t o MR. DYER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your

1

Honor, I've been handling Workers Compensation

If

cases for 29 years. It's the reason I don't appear

1

often in District Court. I've had a number of

1

cases with Jim over the years and I can say that

1

he's one of only three attorneys, I think, that

Jj

have had more years in workers compensation than I

I

have in the State of Utah.

1

MR. BU\CK: His Honor and I were in the

1

same class. So, be careful how o l d -

1

MR. DYER: Yeah, but he hasn't been

1

doing workers compensation the whole time.

1

MR. BLACK: I looked up and I

1

remembered-74, so be careful with that.

1

THE COURT: That's okay.

1

MR. DYER: Jim, in his brief, has

J

called this case one of first impression in Utah,
and I agree. It's, obviously, an issue that

I
1
151

doesn't come up very often.

|

I'm going to do two things. First, I'm

|

going to address our counter-motion for summary

1

judgment, and then I'll respond to WCF's motion.
Our motion is based upon the targeted

m

1
1

tender doctrine. For the purpose of our summary

I

judgment motion only, we are assuming that there

1

were two Workers Compensation policies held by

1

Pioneer Roofing at the time of Mr. Anton's injury.
In short, the targeted tender doctrine

|
1

allows an insured who has multiple policies in

I

place to designate which of the insurance companies

I

is going to provide coverage for the case. That's

1

kind of the short definition.
Courts have written the following about

1
1

this targeted or selective tender doctrine. All of

11

these cases are cited in our brief. Mutual of

1

Enumclaw v. USF Insurance Company said this,

1

quote: "Selective tender preserves the insured's

i

right to invoke or not to invoke the terms of its

1

insurance contracts. The duties to defend and

1

J22

indemnify do not become legal obligations until a

1

23
[24
25

claim for defense or indemnity is tendered", close

I

quote.

1

14

From London Underwriters v. Hartford,
Page
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simple fact of the matter, that there was an

I

forecast his argument, but I would want to respond

13

overlap. Both were covered. An injury took place,

memorandum, but Sharon Steel is 931 P.2d 127.

1

MR. BLACK: And I don't want to
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quote: "If the policy is never triggered, the
issue of liability under the other insurance clause
(that was cited by Mr. Black) does not arise",
close quote.
And, finally, from Bituminous Casualty
Corporation v. Royal Insurance, the court said
this, the Supreme Court of Illinois, quote: "It is
only when an insurer's policy is triggered that the
insurer becomes liable for the defense and
indemnity costs of a claim and it becomes necessary
to allocate the loss among co-insurers. The loss
will be allocated according to the terms of the
other insurance clauses, if any, in the policies
that have been triggered. As discussed above,
Royal's policy was not triggered and its obligation
to defend and indemnify Johnson Construction with
regard to the Peterman lawsuit was excused by the
targeted tender to Bituminous", close quote.
I would like to have you considerTHE COURT: S o - I will just be a
moment.
MR. DYER: Yes, please.
THE COURT: So, is it triggered based
o n - W h o triggers it, the insured?
MR. DYER: Yes, the insured gets to
P a g e 17
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you contact a new insurer. Now, it's not your goal
to pay twice for the same insurance. Nobody has
that as a goal, but for whatever reason, you have a
short period of dual coverage and, actually, during
the period of dual coverage, same storm, same tree
falls over, you have damage to your house. Do you
have to file a claim against either company? No,
you don't have to. Can you file a claim against
one of the insurance companies? Sure, you can.
If you make a claim against that
insurance company, can that insurance company force
you to file a claim against the other insurance
company? That's really the question that's raised
in this case.
THE COURT: Well, is this case different
because of the statute?
MR. DYER: No, no, because it's all the
matter of who has the right to trigger the policy.
THE COURT: Well, but what you are
asking this Court to do is not Utah law. I mean,
to me, this principal is not established in Utah.
MR. DYER: It's a case of first
impression. I will grant you that, because it
doesn't arise very often. We have been doing this
a long time. First time it's ever come up in all
Page 19
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choose.
THE COURT: He decides?
MR. DYER: Yes, absolutely.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: In fact, I want to make that
clear just by way of an example, practical example.
Let's assume that you have a home and you have a
homeowner's policy. During a storm, a tree falls
over and damages your home. Can you make a claim
against the insurance company? Yes.
On the other hand, must you make a
claim against your insurance company? Well, you
might consider there's deductible or co-pays that
you are going to have to pay. So, maybe you don't
want to make that claim. If you do make a claim,
your rates are going to go up. So, maybe you
don't want to make that claim. If you do make a
claim, you are going to have to fill out paper
work. You are going to have to talk to your
adjustor, be interviewed, time. So, you don't want
to do that. So, you could reasonably choose not to
file a claim and your choice would not be wrong or
illegal in any way.
Now, suppose you are at your same house
and you decide to switch insurance companies. So,
P a g e 18
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of our careers. That's why we call it a case of
first impression.
THE COURT: But-okay. But, in my
case, a better way to ask this question is, because
Workman's Compensation contracts or, at least-now,
let me step back for just a moment. You are here
for Workman's Compensation. So, was a claim filed
under your policy? Did you have a policy, or they
justMR. DYER: Yes. The way that commences
is there's an employer's first report of injury and
that employer's first report of injury is filed
with the Labor Commission and with the Workers
Compensation carrier. Upon receipt of that, which
I will say came, unusually, a week after this
catastrophic injury, the Workers Compensation Fund
assumed responsibility for paying the Workers
Compensation benefitsTHE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: - a n d it has been since
then.
THE COURT: Well, okay. So, whereMR. DYER: So, what happened i s THE COURT: No, no, okay.
MR. DYER: I'm sorry.
P a g e 20
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1
THE COURT: I'm not finished yet. I'm
really trying to understand this. So, why~I guess
2
I wasn't aware that there were multiple policies.
3
You know, you hear about Workers Compensation and
4
so on. So, is this a policy-How are you different
5
from Workers Compensation?
6
MR. DYER: Workers Compensation Fund is
1 7
available to all employers in the State of Utah.
| 8
Some-9
THE COURT: Available?
10
MR. DYER: Available. Some states have
11
what they call the unitary system. Everybody has
12
to get insurance from one company1 13
THE COURT: Okay.
1 14
MR. DYER: -like Workers Compensation
I 15
Fund. Utah is not a unitary state. So, there are
| 16
also competing private insurance companies that
17
offer Workers Compensation coverage.
18
THE COURT: Okay.
19
MR. DYER: So, you have Workers
20
Compensation Fund, which is the big fish in the
21
pond. I think they have like sixty percent market
22
share.
23
THE COURT: Okay.
| 24
MR. DYER: And then you have smaller
25
Page 21
companies that similarly offer Workers Compensation
Coverage.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: So, UBIC is one of the
private insurance companies.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: So Stout, Mr. Stout, the
owner of Pioneer Roofing, had a policy with Workers
Compensation Fund and he shopped around and he
found a better deal and wanted to change to UBIC
Insurance, Workers Compensation Insurance.
THE COURT: Okay, but with your hypothank you for that explanation.
MR. DYER: Yes.
THE COURT: But, with your hypothetical,
then, does that break down, your hypothetical, in
light of this paragraph F?
MR. DYER: Not at all. Not at all,
because that's a policy in Workers Compensation
Fund's policyTHE COURT: And in yours?
MR. DYER: And in our policy. Now,
here's the difference. John Stout, the owner of
Pioneer Roofing, upon the injury to Mr. Anton, knew
he had coverage with WCF. He tendered the claim to
Page 22
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h
That invoked their policy1
THE COURT: Right.
I
MR. DYER: - a n d they started to pay.
1
He chose not to tender it to UBIC. He didn't even
1
tell UBIC about it for more than two years. It
j
was like I don't want to bother them. I don't
1
report it to them. He didn't tell us about it.
1
We didn't know about it. We had no idea that
1
there was a claim and the policy that we have has
1
the same provision in it, comes into effect if he
j
tenders it to us. That triggers our policy and,
II
then, this language in our policy would come into
I
effect because it would be triggered by him coming 1
to us and saying I want to invoke my policy with
1
you. It's Mr. Stout's ability to tender the
1
defense. It's not a third party's ability to
1
tender Mr. Stout's or Pioneer Roofing's own policy.
1
THE COURT: Okay. Is this a majority
1
or minority view? My impression is this theory on
1
tendering for targeted or selective tender is a
1
minority view.
1
MR. DYER: Yes, and that's been argued
1
by Mr. Black. Let me address that right now.
1
THE COURT: Sure, okay, that's1
MR. DYER: They argue it's quote, I'm
||
Page 23 1

WCF.

reading from their brief: "A minority position
1
held by less than a handful of states." That's
1
what they say in their brief, but I think their
1
argument is misleading. Let me tell you why.
II
In our brief, we've cited cases
1
supporting the targeted tendered doctrine from
1
Illinois, Montana, Washington, New Hampshire,
i
Connecticut, Arizona, Minnesota, Michigan and the
1
Seventh Circuit. That's eight states and the
1
Seventh Circuit. These are the jurisdictions which
1
have considered and adopted the targeted tender
1
doctrine.
1
On the other hand, WCF has written the
1
35-page brief in response to our motion. AH of
1
one and a half pages dealt with our counter-motion 1
for summary judgment. In their motion, they have 1
cited zero cases, zero cases where the targeted
§
tender defense doctrine has been considered by a
1
jurisdiction and rejected.
1
That's nine jurisdictions, eight states
j
and the Seventh Circuit, that have considered and
1
adopted this doctrine. Zero jurisdictions which
1
have considered and rejected the targeted tender
1
doctrine.
1
So, by my way of math, nine who
|
Page 24 |j
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There are no such cases. We looked for them, too.
It's just-you have to look at the few cases that
have come up.
Remember, this is a very limited issue.
It has never come up before in the State of Utah.
No one is out there looking. Gee, let's see if I
can get two different policies to cover me on one
issue and pay double premium for it. Nobody wants
to be in that position. It's only out of
inadvertence, typically, that such a dual coverage
arises.
THE COURT: Well, that may well be, but
that doesn't change the fact it could happen, does

it?
MR.

DYER: Clearly. This case is the

poster child that it could come into being.
THE COURT: Well, okay. So, are you,
at some point-you don't have to do it now, but at
some point, are you going to talk about the
inception date versus the~
MR.

DYER: Yes.

THE COURT: -April 1st date and this
mutual mistake that you are talking about?
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considered it and adopted it is a hundred percent
versus zero who have considered it and rejected it.

MR.
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DYER: Yes, yes, I will. I will.

That really comes in countering their motion as
opposed to supporting our motion.
THE

COURT: Okay. Okay, while we are

still here, thenMR.

DYER: Sure.

THE

COURT: -what would prevent-Okay,

let's just say that Pioneer, you know, tendering
this to Workers Compensation, you are saying h e -

both insurance companies. I've had an injury.

1
§

never even told UBIC.

I

THE

COURT:

Okay.

MR.

DYER: And once contacted and told

want UBIC to pay this. I only want WCF to pay it.

1

We don't know why because we haven't done any

I

discovery. Certainly, he has not been deposed, but

1

that's his statement.
THE

I

COURT: That argument could be made

in all kinds of situations, you know? You know,

I
1

morning. I'm not good at more hypothetical, but

I

you

1

can-somebody can always say, oh, that's not

what I intended. I just wanted to do this, but

1

buy doing this, it triggered something else. I

1

mean, so, your argument is, basically, the Court

1

either considers or adopts the target of tender

1

doctrine, or I have to adopt, the Court has to

1

adopt that in order to take UBIC off the hook for

1

liability if the Court finds dual coverage, right?
Page

1
27 1

MR. DYER: Yes, that's correct.

1

THE COURT: Okay and, then-

1

MR. DYER: If the Court doesn't find
dual coverage, then our argument doesn't even come
into play.

COURT: But, somehow it did?
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MR.

DYER: Yeah, sure.

1

mistake.

1

MR. DYER: Correct.

1

THE COURT: But, for adopting that

THE

COURT: So, why can't they, then,

there's two policies; therefore, we're going to
rely on F, and if your theory is correct, (f)
doesn't have any meaning.
MR.

DYER: It does if John Stout, the

owner of Pioneer Roofing, were to give notice to
Page

1

THE COURT: Okay, s o MR. DYER: The idea is that Mr. Stout,
the owner of Pioneer Roofing, is the one who gets
1

I19

policy.

1

20
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alter it just a little bit-

THE COURT: Okay, but even though-let's

|
J

THE COURT: - a n d say Pioneer says, or

J

Mr. Stout, is that correct?

1

MR. DYER: Yes, Mr. John Stout is the

1

owner of Pioneer Roofing.

26
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MR. DYER: Yes.
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1

to choose whether to make a claim against his own

18

know, if there's two policies here, why can't-

1
§

MR. DYER: Yes, if-assuming that

14

independently just look to their contract and say,
you

|12

|16
17

I

considering-I haven't considered yet your mutual

115

THE

1
j

THE COURT: Right, and that's not

happened, but somehow happened.

16

I

really didn't mean to do-getting late in the

there's dual coverage.

COURT: So, the Workers Compensation

1

save me from myself. This is what I did, but I

[ 13

THE

I
1

somehow found out that there was another policy?
MR. DYER: Yes. We don't know how that

12
13
14
15

I

about it, he has given us his declaration. I don't

111

111

DYER: Yes, if it chooses to.

1

Mr. Stout only tendered the defense to WCF. He

theory, then UBIC is liable, right?

MR.

if

provisions come into play, but for whatever reason,

110

that company has the exclusive right to tender it?

I'm

giving you notice to both of you, then those
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I want Workers Compensation. I'm directing this to
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THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Stout says, okay,

! 2

it to go to WorkersMR. DYER: Right.
THE COURT: --for whatever reason. I
have an idea, but for this reason, I want to go
here and~does that, even if the Court says-even
if the Court adopts this selective tender doctrine,
can't Workers Compensation say, like probably they
are saying, it's fine for Mr. Stout to direct the
defense over here, but by doing so, we have this;
unique contract provision that says we only have to
pay equal, and now you are saying that contract
provision doesn't apply because he tendered it only
to WCF.
MR. DYER: Right. If he had tendered
it to us, then our policy would have also been
effected.
THE

COURT:

And Workman's Compensation

is saying, not so fast, you know? You tendered it,
but by doing so, we've got this contract provision
that says if there's a second one-okay.
MR. DYER: Now, that issueTHE COURT:

Have I missed something
Page

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
\9
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. DYER: No.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: There's one other related
issue that I would like to address.
THE COURT: Alright, and that is?
MR. DYER: And that is this. Can
insurance companies and insureds, can the parties,
by contract, say that in the event of a dual
coverage, when these rare things that come up, the
insured is contractually required to make a claim
against all policies. Can you do that? The answer
is yes.
There have been two cases cited in our
brief, one in Illinois, one in California, and the
courts in that case upheld the insurance company
who put in a provision that said in the event of
dual coverage, the insured must make a claim
against all carriers that you might have for the
claim, and that's been upheld.
So, the question in this case, is there
such a provision in the Workers Compensation
policy, Workers Compensation Fund policy? The
answer is no. There's no such provision. So, if
30

1

holder has multiple policies or dual coverage, it

1

must make a claim against all such carriers. Then,

1

John Stout wouldn't have a choice. Either he would

J

actually make it or it would be constructively made

1

for him and the claim would proceed along this

1

provision that's been outlined here because it

1

would be required by contract, but that provision

1

is not contained in the WCF policy that was signed

1

by Pioneer Roofing or by John Stout. So, I think

1

that's related to this issue.

J|

For purposes of our motion for summary

If

judgment, we have to prove that John Stout, owner

1

of Pioneer Roofing, did not trigger our policy.

1

We've attached to our motion the written

1

declaration of Mr. Stout. He says this, paragraph

1

nine-

1
THE COURT: Just a moment. Mr. Black,

do you have any argument with that?
MR. BLACK: With?
trigger your policy.
MR. BLACK: Didn't trigger our policy?
MR. DYER: Or, didn't trigger the UBIC?
THE

COURT:

I
1
1

THE COURT: That Mr. Stout didn't

29

there?

they wanted to have a provision in there that said
Page

in connection with dual coverage, if the policy

UBICs policy? (Inaudible)
Page

MR. BLACK: I have arguments regarding
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what was just presented. Do I have an argument

1

regarding whether he triggered it? The accident

1

triggered it. The claim triggered it. It was

1

triggered-

1

THE COURT: Okay.

m

1

MR. BLACK: -for both carriers-

I

THE COURT: Okay.

1

MR. BLACK: - b y the event, by the loss
covered by the Workers Compensation Act.

I
I

THE COURT:' Okay.
MR. DYER: See, but that goes back to
your home that gets damaged by the tree. You,

I
I

then, have to file a claim because the tree hitting
the house triggers it.
THE COURT: Sorry I interrupted you.

1

MR. DYER: Okay, alright.
THE COURT: I didn't save any time with
(inaudible).
MR. DYER: I understand. John Stout,
in his declaration, says this, paragraph 9, quote:
"Upon learning that there was potentially
overlapping Workers Compensation Insurance
coverage, Pioneer made it clear to UBIC that it did
not want UBIC to pay the claim and that WCF should
Page 32 |
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pay it. I wrote a letter to UBIC stating this

1

the targeted tender defense, a case in which every

2

fact on October 8, 2010. Pioneer never tendered

2

jurisdiction which has considered it, nine states

3
4

the claim to UBIC", close quote.
Now, that's the declaration in our

3

and a federal circuit, have agreed and adopted that

4

policy. There's not one case cited before the

5

motion.

6
7
8
9
110

5

Court where it has been considered and rejected.

T H E COURT: Okay.

6

like those odds. So, it's not really a minority

MR. DYER: There has been nothing

7
8

submitted to rebut that motion, nothing whatsoever.

position. It's a minority issue. It doesn't come
up very much, but in the few jurisdictions where it

9

has been discussed, it's a hundred percent in our

10

favor, and that"s why we are asking the Court to

So, for purposes of this motion for summary
judgment, the Court can assume that it's a

'

11

stipulate fact, an accepted fact, that John Stout

11

consider this case along this doctrine because it's

12

tendered the claim to WCF and affirmatively did not

12

a case of first impressions. First time it's come

13

tender the claim to UBIC, and since that's our

13

up.

14

burden, I think that's met.

14

15

THE COURT: Okay, I understand that. I

Now, as to WCF's motion for partial

15

summary judgment, let me address that briefly.
Sorry.

16

understand that argument. Now, I also understand--

16

17

yeah, and when I say there's no dispute, what Mr.

17

18

Stout did, that's what I meant. I mean, now, what

18

best. Normally, we do discovery. We take

19

he did may have had other intended consequences,

19

depositions. We find everything out and, then, we

20

but I think there's no argument as to w h a t -

20

bring these motions.

Number one, the motion is premature, at

Here, we had this motion

21

MR. DYER: What his position is.

21

served upon us after they had received our

22

T H E COURT: - w h a t his position is.

22

discovery response, the written discovery

23

MR. DYER: I agree with that.

23

responses. We hadn't even received theirs.

24

T H E COURT: Okay.

24

MR. DYER: In sum, UBIC believes that

25

125
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There has not been one deposition taken,
not from John Stout, not from the insurance

33

Page

1

the facts of this case fit perfectly with targeted

1

brokers, not from Mr. Anton, who got hurt, not from

2

tender. You have an injury on March 21, 2008.

2

any of the insurance company that know about this

3

Pioneer, Mr. Stout, immediately tenders the claim

3

case. Nobody's been deposed and I think it's

4

to WCF. WCF pays benefits for two full years. We

4

premature to say, gee, we can run down and have

5

are given no notice whatsoever.

5

summary judgment right after we get one set of

6

discovery back. It's just premature. The claim
should be denied on that basis alone.

6

After two years, it's not Mr. Stout that

7

informs us. It's WCF that informs us, and WCF

7

8

tries to tender the claim.

8

9
110

In WCF's motion, page .3, paragraph 6,

9

T H E COURT: What is it that you are

1

asking? I mean, the issue is-Discovery is not

under statement of material facts, here's what's

10

11

written, quote: "When WCF became aware of the dual

11

12

coverage, it (WCF, not Mr. Stout) it asked UBIC to

12

all the evidence is in our favor. That's true.

13
14

assume its contractual liability for the Anton
claim", close quote.

13
14

T H E COURT: I mean, is there anything
that you seek to discover that's going to add to
this selective tender doctrine or targeted?

going to help you with the tender doctrine, is it?
MR. DYER: But, at this point, because

15

So, to some degree, this comes down to

15

16
17

who gets to make a claim against an insurance
policy? Is it the policy holder, Mr. Stout? We

16

18

believe the answer to that is yes. Is it a third

18

I would have probably brought it at the end, but we

19

party? Yes, only if it's contracted for in the

19

thought since we are doing motions, we might as

17

MR. DYER: No. Right now-That's why
we think—It's a little early for us to bring this.

20

policy. If you say there's a claim made, you have

20

well raise it now because based upon the selective

21

to make the claim to all insurance carriers. Okay,

21

tender doctrine, all the facts that the Court needs

22

fine. Then everybody gets notice and it's

22

to know are before it. For our motion, additional

23

automatically tendered.

23

discovery won't impact that.

24
25

Based on these facts and the tender from

24

John Stout just to WCF, this fits perfectly with

25

Page
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T H E COURT: Well, will it for Workman's
Compensation?

34
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MR. DYER: Well, they may say, gee, we
can depose Mr. Stout and see if he wants to change
his mind, I guess, but since it hasn't been
contested today, I think the Court can accept, as a
given fact, that John Stout did not tender to UBIC.

6

It's not contested.

7
8
9
[10
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THE COURT: Well, it's not contested
that he submit the claim to Workman's Compensation.
MR. DYER: Correct.
THE COURT: Now, there may be other
ramifications of what he did that he didn't intend.
MR. DYER: But, that's not been brought
to the Court's attention or to our attention. I
mean, they could maybe argue—
THE COURT: Well, sure it has. Sure it
has. I mean, the Court has to, then, look at
some-For instance, as I understand this, Workman's
Compensation is saying just the accident triggered
this and by it being submitted, it triggered
paragraph F, whether Mr. Stout wanted to or not.
That's what happened, you know? I mean, well, let
me think.
I mean, I, you know, I pulled the plug
in the bathtub and I intended to drain the bath
tub, but I didn't really intend to flood the
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MR. DYER: But, UBIC-and, our position
is that UBIC's policy never comes into play until
Mr. Stout makes the claim against the insurance
company.
THE COURT: I understand that's your
argument. That's not WCF's argument.
MR. DYER: Right.
THE COURT: My question is, what
discovery are you going to get that will explain
that position, flush it out and change it in any
way? It's a legal argument the Court is being
asked to make. I'm asking how does 56(f) make a
difference?
MR. DYER: Well, 56(f) goes more to
WCF's motionTHE COURT: That's what I'm talking
about.
MR. DYER: Okay, and to our claim of
mutual mistake. In other words, Mr. Stout says I
never intended to have overlapping policies, never,
never, never. Who would want to have overlapping
policies? I thought that when I signed up for
coverage with UBIC, my coverage with UBIC would
start at the end of the WCF policy.
THE COURT: Yeah, I never intended to

Page 3i
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basement underneath it, but that's what happened.
I mean, that's probably a poor example but, I mean,
that's what Workman's Compensation is telling me is
that by submitting it, and I understand the theory.
You say it stops there and Workman's Compensation
says it doesn't So, how is discovery going t o What will change that issue? You are either
covered or you are not.
MR. DYER: Not on the targeted tender
defense. I don't believe additional discovery-it
may shed nuances on it, but I think that there's
enough information now forTHE COURT: Okay, you've said that.
So, tell me, on the other side, discovery is going
to help what, whether it was triggered or not? I
mean, that's (inaudible).
MR. DYER: No, no. Discovery on the
targeted tender issue, I don't think i s THE COURT: No, no, no. Workman's Comp
is saying just by submitting it to us, that
provision applies to you. I mean, it's kind of
interwoven with your targeted tender. It either is
or it isn't, and if it isn't, Workman's
Compensation is saying Court, will you please read
(f) to get UBIC to share in that loss in this?

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

have binding—
MR. DYER: I never intended to have
dual coverage.
THE COURT: I never intended to have
binding arbitration. I never saw that. I never
read that. I would never do that if I knew it was
in there, but it's there. I mean, he signed it.
MR. DYER: He did sign it.
THE COURT: And he got the policy and
mutual mistake, I mean, I don't know if it's mutual
or unilateral mistake. I don't know what it is,

12

but-

13
14
15
16
17
18

MR. DYER: Well, see, that's why we
haven't taken any depositions to find out.
THE COURT: Why is that not just a
legal argument?
MR. DYER: Well, suppose we find out
that there's a history of this kind of thing that's

19

gone on-

20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT: Well, there's not a history
because you just admitted it's not.
MR. DYER: Well, we don't know.
THE COURT: I mean, it's a rare event.
MR. DYER: It's a rare event, but I
don't know how common it is. We haven't done any

Page 40
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discovery. I don't know.
THE COURT: Well, it's rare enough that
it's first impression here.
MR. DYER: It is, to my knowledge. I
don't know of any other cases of this type that
have arisen.
THE COURT: Okay. Then, I need to make
a quick phone call, and then let's talk about
mutual mistake or whatever else you need to bring
this together. I don't want to keep you here. I
think I understand the primary argument, the issue
here. Mutual mistake is something else. I'll give
you a chance, obviously, to respond to both of
these, but I need to make a phone call and I'll be
right back.
(Recess)
THE COURT: Mr. Dyer, if you want to
come back up and talk about the mutual mistake, or
are you through on your other issue?
MR. DYER: Yeah, I'm through with the
other issue.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
MR. DYER: The only thing I was going
to mention is that with mutual mistake, we've
alleged facts that there is a mutual mistake as to
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because it was a mutual mistake. It didn't know
either that the policy had created dual coverage,
no idea. Once it found out that there was dual
coverage, it was like oh, well, nobody intended
that.
THE COURT: No one intended to flood
the basement, but it happened. S o ~
MR. DYER: I understand mistakes happen
and mistakes happen that people don't want to have
happen and in this case, Mr. Stout didn't want to
have dual coverage and pay for two policies that
only provided him one coverage.
THE COURT: Well, who is in the best
position to know what the coverage period is with
WCF?
MR. DYER: Who is in the best position
to know what the policy was for the WCF policy?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. DYER: WCF.
THE COURT: No, Mr. Stout. He should
know when his policy expires.
MR. DYER: Presumably. I haven't
deposed him. I don't know. You would assume that
he would know.
THE COURT: Okay, well, let me hear
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dual coverage coming into play or occurred as a
result of mutual mistake, and WCF disputes our
claims.
THE COURT: Well, who made the mistakes?
MR. DYER: Well, the mistake is made,
primarily, first by John Stout, who said, didn't
mean to have coverage. Didn't intend to have
coverage until after the policy came into play.
Now, maybe the broker who sold him the policy
filled it out wrong and he didn't explain it to
him, didn't see it. Who knows?
THE COURT: Well, can the Court look at
that?
MR. DYER: Can the Court look at the
policy?
THE COURT: No, what the broker said.
I mean, if the contract is not ambiguous on its
face, can I look at parole evidence?
MR. DYER: On mutual mistake, the parole
evidence is admissible. We've argued that.
THE COURT: Well, whose-The mutual
mistake is UBIC and Mr. Stout?
MR. DYER: Yes, yes, absolutely. UBIC
assumed that its policy would go into effect after
the WCF policy expired and it didn't correct it
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what you have to say.
MR. DYER: So, I'm just saying that
there are issues on that particular issue with
mutual mistake that could be flushed out with
discovery, and that has not occurred at all. So,
that's why I think that it's premature and, then,
finally, WCF's position relative to this time chart
and that sort of thing presumes that WCF gets to
override John Stout's ability to tender a claim to
its own insurance company. It's not John Stout
that gets to decide. WCF gets to decide and we
think that, based upon the targeted tender rule,
that that's just wrong.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: Only Mr. Stout should be
able to make that claim.
THE COURT: Alright.
MR. DYER: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Black?
MR. BLACK: Let me just address what
was last said about the targeted tender. It isn't
WCF that decides. It's not UBIC that decides when
the coverage is. It is decided by the statute.
Once a policy is put in place and filed with the
Labor Commission, the Utah Code provides that it is
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from that point of inception until there is a
notice to cancel properly filed, both with the
employer, the insured and the insurance company,
that policy continues, and what is the kick-off
point?
The kick-off point of the dual coverage
is March 21st-of the liability is March 21st, 2008,
when Mr. Anton was injured. To allow this targeted
tender in a circumstance of a statutory scheme,
such as Workers Compensation, invites the mischief
the compensation scheme was designed to prevent and
that is picking and choosing. That does not happen
in the Workers Compensation Act.
Not one of these cases cited by Mr.
Dyer, in fact, deals with the Workers Compensation
circumstance. They deal with private insurance of
liability in which-and construction sites where
there has been a general contractor and a
subcontractor, and in one or both of those
contracts, there's an agreement to hold the other
harmless and purchase insurance, purchase insurance
to cover and name the other as insured. That's the
circumstance, and that's where all the noise is in
Illinois.
Now, I searched and there are not-I did
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start at this time. Think about what would happen
if this isn't your homeowner policy. This is a
statutory required policy, and it's required to the
benefit of both the employer and that injured
worker.
Let's suppose we have the same
situation. The insurer, the roofing company, the
insured, the roofing company says, let's take Utah,
the Workers Compensation Fund out of that
altogether and they have insurance that starts here
and that, obviously, covers it, but let's say they
come down there, well, we didn't intend for it to
start there. W e wanted it to start over here.
Then, they manipulate it to eliminate the liability
that has already occurred.
That is what mischief the Act is
designed to prevent, and think about this just for
a minute. This is a contractual obligation, the
other insurance. It's in both policies. So, if he
selects one over the other in this format that is
being prescribed for a selective tender, he
breaches one contract or the other.
The only way you don't breach one
contract or the other is to apply the other
insurance. You apply the other insurance. That's
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not find one case where the Workers Compensation
system of a state was put into this circumstance.
T H E COURT: Okay.
MR. BLACK: Not one case.
T H E COURT: Alright. Can you talk to
me about the mutual mistake?
MR. BLACK: I can, indeed. Mutual
mistake of fact, indeed, is a methodology of
reforming a contract. Not a Workers Compensation
contract, because it's governed by statute. If the
Workers Compensation contract is in place, you have
to go through the process to cancel it, and why do
you do that? Let me see the second poster.
Why do we do that? We do that and the
Legislature did that to avoid the kind of
circumstance that has taken place here. If we
follow this timeline, you will note, Your Honor,
that when UBIC was notified, they wait a good long
time, and then they start doing these things with
the insured to get letters from him saying, well, I
didn't intend this. I didn't intend that. That's
why the statute is this way, so that there would be
that responsibility.
Once that insurance is in place, you
can't go back and say I didn't intend for it to
Page 4 6
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how the whole system is designed and, Your Honor,
there is a case, and it's a well-reasoned case, in
which-what did I do with my glasses? I'm getting
to that point.
Minnesota, originally, adopted a form of
this selective tender and here's how they respond
to it in the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case
of Cargill, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Co.
They say, although some jurisdictions have held, as
we did-they are overturning an earlier decision,
in Iowa National-that a primary insurer cannot
obtain contribution from a co-primary insurer that
refused to defend, these cases represent the
minority view. Most courts have held that an
insurer has an equitable right, whether by
contribution or subrogation, to recover defense
costs, at least partially, when primary insurers
also have a duty to defend a common insured.
That principle applies equally to the
indemnification responsibility, and that is totally
consistent with the case I cited to Your Honor
earlier of Sharon Steel that talks about equitable
subrogation in Utah; albeit, not in the Workers
Compensation. I don't believe this was in the
Workers Compensation setting, but that is, indeed,
Page 4 8
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the law of Utah.
There's no reason to go out and pick up
a splinter selective tender theory from a few
states. I looked. I didn't find nine that
supported it, and that may be a failing of my
research.
THE COURT: That's okay.
MR. BLACK: But, there is no benefit,
and what is the benefit to the insured in this case
to selecting one over the other? There really is
no benefit to it. There is no benefit because the
NCCI, that's the rate making organization of which
I spoke, the accidents that occur in a given
employment follow the insured. So, when he applies
for insurance from another insurance carrier, that
experience follows him and has an affect on his
premiums. So, he can't even benefit from this
selective choice. That isn't the way the Workers
Compensation Act has been set up.
And, mutual mistake of fact? You don't
recreate a contract after the liability event
occurs, and there are responsibilities that flow
from that. When an application for a hearing, for
example, in a disputed claim is filed before the
Labor Commission, the Labor Commission advises of
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original contract.
1
THE COURT: Okay.
I
MR. BLACK: So, Your Honor, that is the
I
sort of thing that the Act prevents happening when
1
you stay, when your policy stays in force until you
1
follow the procedures set forth by the Legislature
I
to cancel it, and the liabilities are fixed as of
1
the date of loss, and unless you have questions,
1
I'm finished.
1
THE COURT: I do have a question.
I
MR. BLACK: Okay.
1
THE COURT: And still going with this
1
mutual mistake. I mean, if, under the statute, if
1
you submit a contract or I don't know. Do you
1
submit it, or do you submit notice of a contract?
I
MR. BLACK: The contract, once entered
1
into, is filed with the Utah Labor Commission.
11
THE COURT: Okay, and thatI
MR. BLACK: And, then, it's enforced.
I
This statute comes into play.
1
THE COURT: And, then, this UBIC policy
I
was filed with the Labor Commission?
j
MR. BLACK: Yes, yes, yes.
1
THE COURT: Okay.
1
MR. BLACK: The UBIC policy that had
1
Page 51 I

who the insurance carriers are. They have to file,
the insurance carriers have to file over at the
Labor Commission for this period of time. Even
today, both carriers are named as insurance
carriers for the roofing company.
Your Honor, this is a matter of partial
summary judgment that is appropriate. There aren't
facts that change the circumstance, other than the
fact that there are all these machinations, after
the complaint was filed, to secure letters from the
insured after the complaint was filed and, on
February 18th, after discovery was-after the
initial discovery, they have a copy of the reformed
contract trying, at that time, to refer back to
February and undo the February 18th, 2008 date of
inception of the contract. That is the sort of
mischief that is to be avoided.
THE COURT: Wait just a minute. What's
this reformed contract?
MR. BLACK: March 28th, 2011.
THE COURT: They went back and~
MR. BLACK: They supplemented their
discovery with a copy of a reformed contract that
was drafted February 18th, 2011, trying to refer
back and establish a new commencement date for the
Page 50
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the conception date of February 22nd1
THE COURT: Twenty-second.
1
MR. BLACK: -was, indeed, filed with
1
the Labor Commission. Exhibits that we have given
1
Your Honor show that UBIC billed the insured for
1
the partial month of February 22nd t o 1
THE COURT: When they were1
MR. BLACK: -March 1st, and then
1
continued billing from then. There was payment for
J
that policy from the commencement date.
1
THE COURT:* March or April? March or
|
April? I don't know that it matters, but1
MR. BLACK: From then on. From
1
February 22nd on, there was a billing for partial
1
money1
THE COURT: Okay.
I
MR. BLACK: - i n which it stated that
the inception date is February 22nd.
1
THE COURT: Okay. I think I understand
1
what the issue is. I will take this under
1
advisement. I will have a decision probably within
J
a week, maybe ten days and I will have that out to
1
you quickly.
1
MR. BLACK: Thank you.
I
THE COURT: Anything else this morning?
1
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XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Patrol Helicopters, Inc., CV-08-73-BU-RFC-JCL. (MTDC)
XL SPECIALTY INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff,
v.
PATROL HELICOPTERS, INC., C. THOMAS MESSICK, Individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Theresa J. Messick; CRAIG A BOWMAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Joan R. Bowman, DARRELL E. BOWMAN, and PROGRESSIVE
CASUALTY INS. CO., Defendants.
No. CV-08-73-BU-RFC-JCL.
United States District Court, D. Montana, Butte Division.
December 21, 2009.
ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
RICHARD F. CEBULL, District Judge.
Plaintiff XL Specialty Insurance Company filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it
owes no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant Patrol Helicopters for a July 2006 automobile accident.
Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch has entered Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 69) on the
parties' motions for summary judgment, concluding that the XL's policy provides coverage for the accident,
that XL's duty to defend was triggered by a letter from counsel for plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit, and
that Progressive cannot seek equitable contribution from XL. These conclusions result in a
recommendation that Patrol Helicopters Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) be granted, that XL's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41) be granted in part, and that Progressive's Motion for Summary
Judgment Regarding Priority of Insurance (Doc. 43) be denied.
Upon service of a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation, a party has 10 days to file
written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). XL filed timely objections on November 9, 2009 (Doc. 70), while
Progressive filed objections three days later (Doc. 73). Numerous responses were filed until the flood of
briefs ceased on December 4, 2009. The objections require the Court to review de novo those portions of
the Findings and Recommendations to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As discussed
below, Magistrate Judge Lynch's Findings and Recommendations are well-grounded in law and fact and
all objections are ovemLled.
XL's first objection is to Judge Lynch's conclusion that coverage was not precluded by Patrol's
failure to comply with the notice provision in the insurance policy. Judge Lynch concluded that even if XL
could prove that it did not receive notice "immediately" or "as soon as practicable" as required by the
policy, XL could not prove it was prejudiced by the delay. Although XL now claims that a showing of
prejudice is not required, it did not offer this argument to Judge Lynch. For that reason, the Court need not
consider it now. Regardless, Judge Lynch thoroughly reviewed Montana law in the area and correctly
concluded the Montana Supreme Court, consistent with the majority ofjurisdictions, would impose a
prejudice requirement for notice provisions in liability policies. To the extent XL argues that it was
prejudiced, it merely repeats the arguments made to Judge Lynch. XL's first objection is overruled.
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XL also objects to the conclusion that the subject accident arose out of the use of the insured
helicopter. Again, XL repeats the same arguments that Magistrate Judge Lynch addressed and rejected.
The holding that the phrase "arising out of is ambiguous when undefined has previously resulted in
insurance coverage in contravention of common sense. See Mitchell v. American Reliable Ins. Co., 2009
WL 3326418 (9th Cir. 2009) citing Pablo v. Moore, 995 P.2d 460 (Mont. 2000). That rule, however, is the
law which this Court must follow. Because the accident would not have occurred absent the use or
maintenance of Patrol's helicopter, XL's second objection must be overruled.
XL's final objection is a continuation of its argument that its duty to defend Patrol in the
underlying suit was never triggered because neither Patrol nor Progressive, the co-insurer, asked it to
defend. As noted by Judge Lynch, however, the duty to defend is triggered by knowledge of facts that
represent a risk covered by an insurance policy. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P3d 381, 385
(Mont. 2004). Here, XL was notified by a letter from the underlying plaintiffs' counsel, together with a copy
ofthe complaint, that set forth facts representing a risk covered by the XL policy. Accordingly, XL's third
objection is overruled.
Progressive objects to Judge Lynch's conclusion that because both Patrol and Progressive did
not affirmatively request assistance from XL, the selective tender rule bars equitable contribution and XL is
not liable. Progressive first argues its motion for summary judgment is not based on equity, but on the
plain language ofthe "other insurance" clauses in its and XL's insurance policies. According to
Progressive, equitable contribution does not apply because no claim has yet been paid, citing Casualty
Indemnity Insurance Co., 902 F.Supp. at 1237 (the "doctrine of equitable contribution' permits an insurer,
which has paid a claim, to seek contribution directly from other insurers who are liable for the same loss").
Regardless, as noted by Judge Lynch, Casualty Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Liberty National Fire
Insurance Co., 902 F.Supp. 1235 (D. Mont. 1995) makes clear that the issue here is equitable contribution.
Similarly, Progressive claims Judge Lynch overlooked the insurance policies' "other insurance"
provisions. The other insurance provisions, however, are inapplicable-there is no other insurance because
neither Patrol nor Progressive tendered the claim to XL for defense or indemnification.
As to this finding of fact, Progressive also objects. Although the statement of facts contained in
Progressive's objections documents several instances of contact between the lawyers representing Patrol
and XL, including that XL was asked to "investigate coverage" under its policy, there is no evidence that
Progressive or Patrol affirmatively asked XL for defense or indemnification. Judge Lynch correctly
concluded that under Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. V. Gulflns. Co., 776 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1985),
which this Court cited with approval in Casualty Indemnity Insurance Co., asking XL to "investigate
coverage" is insufficient.
After a de novo review, the Court determines the Findings and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Ostby are well grounded in law and fact and HEREBY ORDERS they be adopted in their entirety:
(1) Patrol's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
(2) XL's Motion for Summary Judgment barring Progressive from seeking equitable
contribution is GRANTED, but XL's motion is DENIED in all other respects; and
(3) Progressive's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Priority of Insurance is DENIED.
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The Clerk of Court shall notify the parties ofthe entry of this Order and enter judgment
accordingly.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Tab 5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
JAIME ZAVALA,
*

ORDER OF REMAND

Applicant,
*
*

v.

*
PRESTWICH LUMBER CO., UNITED
STAFFING ALLIANCE (uninsured),
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION FUND,
*
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND,
RODNEY PRESTWICH, RONALD
PRESTWICH and DEBBIE PRESTWICH,
*

r^^cn TVT^ o n n n o

Defendants.

United Staffing Alliance and its workers compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company, (referred to jointly as "Liberty Mutual") ask the Utah Labor Commission to
review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Liberty Mutual is liable for Jaime
Zavala's workers' compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act";
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Pursuant to §34A-2-205 of the Act, is Liberty Mutual liable for Mr. Zavala's workers'
compensation benefits solely on the grounds that Liberty Mutual notified the Commission it was Mr.
Zavala's employer's insurance carrier?

BACKGROUND
On May 7,1998, Mr. Zavala was injured in a work-related accident at Prestwich Lumber Co.
("Prestwich") The parties agree that Mr. Zavala is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his
injuries. Liberty Mutual and the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") have jointly paid such
benefits, subject to adjustment after their respective liabilities are finally determined.
It appears that at the time of Mr. Zavala's accident, Prestwich had no workers' compensation
insurance. Sometime after the accident, Prestwich entered into an employee leasing agreement with
United Staffing Alliance. By virtue of that agreement, Prestwich obtained workers' compensation
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insurance through Liberty Mutual. It is unclear whether Prestwich informed either United Staffing
Alliance or Liberty Mutual of Mr. Zavala's accident and injuries.
On June 21, 1998, Liberty Mutual notified the Commission that is had provided workers'
compensation coverage for Prestwich effective May 2, 1998. However, the parties now dispute
whether Prestwich's insurance coverage was to be backdated to: a) May 2,1998, five days before the
accident; or b) May 11, 1998, four days after Mr. Zavala's accident. The parties agree that these
questions of fact relate to the terms and conditions of the underlying insurance contract and must be
resolved by a court of general jurisdiction, rather than the Commission. Liberty Mutual has
instituted proceedings in the District Court for that purpose.
While the UEF acknowledges the necessity of District Court action to determine the terms of
the underlying insurance contract between Liberty Mutual and Prestwich, the UEF contends that
§34A-2-205(l) of the Act1 constitutes a separate and independent basis to hold Liberty Mutual liable
for Mr. Zavala's benefits. The UEF further argues that the Commission may exercise jurisdiction to
decide this specific issue without reference to the pending District Court proceedings.
The ALJ has accepted the UEF's arguments and concluded that, regardless of the parties'
actual intent or any other considerations, Liberty Mutual's notice to the Commission of the May 2,
1998, coverage date results in Liberty Mutual1 s absolute liability for Mr. Zavala's workers'
compensation benefits. Liberty Mutual now seeks Commission review of the ALJ's decision.

A

Section 34A-2-205(l) provides as follows:
(a) Every insurance carrier writing workers' compensation insurance coverage in
this state or for this state, regardless of the state in which the policy is written,
shall file notification of that coverage with the division or its designee within 30
days after the inception date of the policy in the form prescribed by the division.
(b) A policy described in Subsection (l)(a) is in effect from inception until
canceled by filing with the division or its designee a notification of cancellation in
the form prescribed by the division within ten days after the cancellation of a
policy.
(c) Failure to notify the division or its designee under Subsection (l)(b) will result
in the continued liability of the carrier until the date that notice of cancellation is
received by the division or its designee.
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DISCUSSION
This case presents tangled facts superimposed against a statute that is not crystal clear.
These difficulties are compounded by the related proceedings that are going forward in the District
Court.
The Commission has some reservations regarding the correctness of the proposition that an
insurance carrier's notice of coverage filed with the Commission will, in every case, result in the
carrier's absolute liability for workers' compensation benefits. While such a proposition may be
appropriate in most situations, a different result may be necessary on occasion. One possible
exception is noted in Larson's Workers'Compensation Law, §150.02(4):
The only situation in which the insurance would be defeated for all purposes
by act of the employer is that in which the insurance is absolutely void ab initio,
rather than voidable; this would occur if the employer attempted to insure against an
accident that had already occurred, by pre-dating the insurance and fraudulently
concealing the known existence of an accident within the period so covered.
It is possible that the circumstances discussed by Professor Larson may be present in this
case. Consequently, the Commission cannot say as a matter of law that §34A-2-205(l) makes
Liberty Mutual absolutely liable for Mr. Zavala's benefits. Any such determination requires
additional findings of fact.
Because this matter is proceeding in the District Court, which has general jurisdiction to
determine the facts and apply relevant law to ascertain the relationships among the parties, the
Commission considers it improvident to go forward with its own parallel adjudicative proceedings.
Consequently, the Commission remands this matter to the ALJ with instructions to hold this matter
in abeyance pending the District Court's determination. Either party may then request the ALJ to
adjudicate any issues within the Commission's jurisdiction that remain unresolved at that time.
ORDER
This matter is remanded to the ALJ for further action consistent with this decision. It is so
ordered.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2001.

R. Lee Ellertson
Utah Labor Commissioner
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